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INTRODUCTION
The World Bank plays an indispensable role as a global leader in 
combating poverty world-wide.  Comprising the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (“IBRD”) and the International Develop-
ment Association (“IDA”), the World Bank provides funds to developing 
countries with the aim of eradicating poverty and hunger.1  Since 1990, it 
has disbursed more than $690 billion.  In fiscal year 2015 alone, it commit-
ted $60 billion in loans, grants, and guarantees across more than 300 pro-
jects.2  This amount exceeds the gross domestic products of roughly half 
the world’s countries.  Projects funded by the Bank can be an attractive 
source of potential business for the private sector, with nearly half of recent 
funds going to infrastructure projects in the energy, transportation, water, 
and IT sectors—areas ripe for private sector participation.3
The countries receiving the most World Bank funds—the world’s un-
derdeveloped and developing countries—also tend to be those perceived as 
posing higher corruption risks.4  The Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index (“TI CPI”) is a commonly used proxy for corruption 
 1.  See The World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank xix (3d ed. 2011) (explaining the 
role of the World Bank).  The term “World Bank” refers to the IBRD and IDA, while the 
“World Bank Group” refers collectively to the IBRD and IDA, together with the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (“IFC”), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(“MIGA”), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).  
Id. at 2, 10.  Unless specifically noted otherwise, references in this article to the Bank or the 
World Bank refer to the IBRD and IDA.   
 2.  See The World Bank, Annual Report 2015, 4-5, 30, 34, 38, 42, 46, and 50 (2015), 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/annual-report [https://perma.cc/AQM5-ZH3T] (detail-
ing World Bank funding in 2015).  The World Bank Annual Report 2014 covers the period 
from July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015. 
 3.  See The World Bank, Annual Report 2014, 15 (2014) (reporting that helping coun-
tries to meet basic infrastructure needs accounted for 47 percent of World Bank’s total assis-
tance of client countries in fiscal 2014).
 4.  See generally Eric Chetwynd et al., Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent 
Literature, (Management Systems International, D.C.), Jan. 2003; S. Gupta et al., Does Cor-
ruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? 29 (IMF Working Paper, May 1998) (“The 
impact of corruption on income inequality and poverty is considerable.”); Paolo Mauro, 
Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research, 35 FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT, at 13 (Mar. 1998) (“One striking empirical finding is that poorer countries 
are usually considered to be more corrupt.”); The Integrity Vice Presidency, FY 13 Annual 
Update (The World Bank, D.C.), 2013, at 3 (“Those who have the greatest need are also the 
most vulnerable.  It is precisely because institutions may be weak, systems lacking, and re-
sources scarce that countries turn to the World Bank for financial and technical assis-
tance.”).
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risk.5  In 2015, the TI CPI scored 167 countries and territories on a scale 
from 0 to 100.  Countries that score less than 50 out of 100 “are perceived 
to have a serious corruption problem.”6  The top ten recipients of IDA fi-
nancing for fiscal year 2015—Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Vietnam—averaged a score of 
just 30.7 on the 2015 TI CPI.7  The top ten all-time recipients of IBRD 
funds—Argentina, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine—fare only slightly better with an average TI 
CPI score of 38.3.8  In the last decade, these countries were cited more than 
280 times in U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement ac-
tions.9
Companies pursuing Bank-funded projects can face heightened risks 
of corruption and other contracting improprieties.  The size, scope, and 
complexity of many of these projects, combined with the potential for sub-
stantial government involvement in geographies with challenging regulato-
ry regimes and local business customs, amplify the risks.10  Of course, the 
 5.  Transparency International is a global organization that seeks “to stop corruption 
and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of 
society.” Mission, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values/0/
[https://perma.cc/7E6X-5DLQ].  Its Corruption Perceptions Index “ranks countries and ter-
ritories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be[,] . . . drawing on corrup-
tion-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions.” Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2014: In Detail, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail [https://perma.cc/5UU4-4U49].
 6.  See Visualizing the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/infographic [https://perma.cc/89PU-
5REA] (charting global corruption perceptions in 2013).
 7.  See The World Bank, IDA Financing, http://www.worldbank.org/ 
ida/financing.html [https://perma.cc/8Y9Q-E3PZ] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (detailing re-
cipients of IDA Financing); Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 
2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table [https://perma.cc/QNN8-GTX7] 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (charting the corruption score of each country and territory).  
These same ten countries have an average rank of 137.5 (out of 189) for “ease of doing 
business” in the World Bank’s June 2015 Doing Business Report—an annual survey of the 
ease of doing business around the world.  The World Bank Group, Doing Business – Econ-
omy Rankings, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings [https://perma.cc/LUD3-NRWL] 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016).   
 8.  See Annual Report 2015, supra note 2, at 57 (charting recipients of IDA funds); 
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table [https://perma.cc/2S3R-QLJ4] (last vis-
ited Feb. 29, 2016) (charting perceived corruption of various countries).
 9.  Gibson Dunn analysis (on file with author).  The FCPA prohibits bribery of non-
U.S. public officials and sets standards of recordkeeping and internal controls at corpora-
tions that are publicly traded in the United States, and is dually enforced by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.   
 10.  See generally Dana Maria Pop, Tackling Corruption in Development Projects: 
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World Bank is attuned to these risks and their consequences; it estimates 
that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes globally each year.11  The World 
Economic Forum has estimated that the cost of corruption annually exceeds 
5% of the global gross domestic product, adding up to a 10% surcharge to 
the cost of doing business globally and up to 25% to the cost of procure-
ment contracts in developing countries.12  These figures help to quantify 
how corruption can sap the World Bank’s resources and deeply undermine 
its mission.  As World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim articulated, 
“[E]ach dollar lost to corruption is a dollar stolen from a pregnant woman 
who needs health care; or from a girl or a boy who deserves an education; 
or from communities that need roads and clean water.”13
Dovetailing with this broader concern, the IBRD’s Articles of Agree-
ment themselves require it to “make arrangements to ensure that the pro-
ceeds of any [funding] are used only for the purposes for which the [fund-
ing] was granted,” creating a fiduciary duty that underpins its efforts to 
police misconduct in Bank-funded projects.14  To combat the fraud and cor-
World Bank Sanctions and Corporate Risks, SUSTAINALYTICS,
http://www.sustainalytics.com/tackling-corruption-development-projects-world-bank-
sanctions-and-corporate-risks [https://perma.cc/3K28-ZABN] (analyzing impact of corrup-
tion on business); see also John Lurie & Nicholas Burkill, Bribery and Corruption in the 
Construction Industry: Challenges for International Construction and Engineering Projects,
29 CONSTRUCTION L.J. 17 (Feb. 2013) (looking at bribery and corruption in the construction 
industry).
 11.  See Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global 
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann, THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190295~menuPK:34457~pagePK:34370~
piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html [https://perma.cc/YX99-S8XG] (last visited Mar. 24, 
2016) (estimating annual worldwide bribery of about $1 trillion); see also The World Bank’s 
Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s Guide, (The World Bank, 
D.C.) Oct. 15, 2006 (“Diversion of funds from development projects through fraud, corrup-
tion, collusion, and coercion or obstruction . . . impairs the ability of governments, donors 
and the World Bank to achieve the goals of reducing poverty, attracting investment, and en-
couraging good governance.”); Sanjay Pradhan, How Open Data is Changing International 
Aid, TED TALKS,  https://www.ted.com/talks/sanjay_pradhan_how_open_data_is_changing_ 
international_aid/transcript?language=en [https://perma.cc/MZ5S-6SVT] (June 2012) 
(“[T]he challenge of development: abject poverty surrounded by corruption.”); Corruption
‘Impoverishes and Kills Millions,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-29040793 [https://perma.cc/NLF2-XBX5] (reporting that millions of lives are 
lost because of $1 trillion a year taken out of poor countries due to corruption).   
 12.  International Chamber of Commerce et al., The Business Case against Corruption
at 2, (providing the estimates of the cost of corruption).   
 13.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Of-
fice of Suspension and Debarment, D.C.) 2015, 3.   
 14.  IBRD Articles of Agreement, art. III, § 5(b); accord IDA Articles of Agreement, 
art. V, § 1(g); see also Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra
note 13, at 7 (explaining the World Bank’s fiduciary duty deriving from its Articles of 
Agreement); World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. I § 1.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012) (requiring 
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ruption that undermine its goal of fighting poverty, the World Bank has 
implemented—and continually developed—robust integrity enforcement 
mechanisms to discipline firms and individuals found to have engaged in 
misconduct in connection with Bank-funded projects. 
The implementation of enforcement mechanisms is a relatively recent 
development in the Bank’s seventy-plus year history.  In 1999, the Bank 
created the Anti-Corruption and Fraud Investigation Unit—the precursor to 
what is now The Integrity Vice Presidency (“INT”), the Bank’s investigato-
ry and prosecutorial division—and brought its first sanction cases against 
seven companies and two individuals.15  Also in 1999, the Bank defined 
two types of misconduct that can lead to sanctions (called “Sanctionable 
Practices”)—fraudulent and corrupt practices.  This was followed by the 
addition of collusive and coercive practices in 2004 and an “obstructive 
practice” in 2006.  World Bank Guidelines provide unique descriptions of 
each of the five Sanctionable Practices and specify the elements of each of-
fense.16
In recent years, World Bank enforcement of Sanctionable Practices 
has been vigorous.  Over the five years from 2011 to 2015, the World Bank 
publicly sanctioned more than 300 entities and numerous subsidiaries, 
reaching a high water mark of 84 in fiscal year 2012.17  During roughly the 
same time period, by comparison, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—the dual enforc-
ers of the FCPA—initiated 144 FCPA enforcement actions.18  The World 
Bank also has a significant pipeline of cases, with 99 new investigations 
initiated in fiscal year 2015.19
The Bank’s sanctions regime is not supposed to be punitive.20  Never-
the World Bank to ensure the funds it provides are used only for their intended purposes).   
 15.  The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 14 Annual Update, (The World Bank, D.C.) at 1.  
 16.  The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s 
Guide, supra note 11, at 5-9. 
 17.  FY 14 Annual Update, at 34; FY 15 Annual Update, at 38. 
 18.  2015 Year-Year FCPA Update (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) Jan. 4, 2016, at 2, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2015-Year-End-FCPA-Update.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/8JWV-FNFS].  
 19.  FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 1. 
 20.  See Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Pro-
cess and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 4 
n.23 (“The principal goal of World Bank Group sanctions proceedings is to protect the 
Group’s funds, not to ‘punish’ respondents . . . .”).  In contrast to SEC and DOJ enforcement 
actions, World Bank sanctions typically do not involve monetary penalties.  See Frank Fari-
ello & Giovanni Bo, The World Bank Group Sanctions System and Access to Justice for 
Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 5 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW 417, 436 (H. Cissé 
et al. ed. 2014) (noting the Bank’s sanctions system is meant to be protective and rehabilita-
tive, involving re-education and commitment on the part of the respondent); World Bank 
Sanctions Procedures, art. IX § 9.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (describing the nature of the sanctions 
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theless, the consequences for violating the World Bank’s guidelines have 
teeth.  Of the types of sanctions available, the most severe is debarment, 
which precludes entities for a period of time from participating, directly or 
indirectly, in future Bank-financed activities.21  If a company’s business 
depends on projects funded even in part by multilateral development banks 
(“MDBs”), debarment can pose a greater threat—indeed, often an existen-
tial one—than the court or administrative sanctions associated with an 
FCPA enforcement action.22
Sanctions are public23 and often accompanied by severe conditions 
and collateral consequences, including the imposition of a corporate com-
pliance monitor and third-party investigator,24 ongoing cooperation re-
quirements,25 reciprocal blacklisting by other MDBs and members of the 
World Bank Group,26 and referrals to government authorities.27  On a more 
such as being declared ineligible for a Bank-financed contract or loan). 
 21.  Id.
 22.  See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-36 (2014) (comparing the threat of debarment with FCPA ac-
tion).
 23.  See Todd J. Canni, Debarment is No Longer Private World Bank Business: An Ex-
amination of the Bank’s Distinct Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procurements 
and Financed Projects, 40 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 147,147–48 (2010) (discussing circum-
stances that led the Bank to publicize all debarments).   
 24.  See, e.g., Press Release, The World Bank, The World Bank Group Debars Macmil-
lan Limited for Corruption in World Bank-supported Education Project in Southern Sudan 
(April 30, 2010) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2010/04/30/the-world-
bank-group-debars-macmillan-limited-for-corruption-in-world-bank-supported-education-
project-in-southern-sudan [https://perma.cc/2B7V-UUH9] (describing the actions the sanc-
tioned party agreed to take as a condition of reduced debarment).  For a detailed discussion 
of FCPA monitorships, see generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Veronica S. 
Root, Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011).
 25.  See, e.g., Press Release The World Bank, World Bank Debars SWECO Environ-
ment AB, and Conditionally Non-debars SWECO International AB for Three Years (Mar. 
28, 2014) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/28/world-bank-debars-
sweco-environment-three-years [https://perma.cc/5594-CMSE] (noting that the sanctions 
include the sanctioned party’s cooperation with INT’s investigation). 
 26.  Sanctions issued by the Bank may be enforced by other international financial in-
stitutions pursuant to the April 9, 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment 
Decisions.  In addition, each member of the World Bank Group has its own sanctions pro-
cedures, which can differ slightly.  For example, a World Bank debarment does not neces-
sarily lead to a reciprocal debarment by the IFC, because the IFC’s sanctions procedures 
govern how a World Bank debarment impacts the ability to participate in IFC projects.  See
IFC Sanctions Procedures, art. IX § 9.01(c) (discussing the impact of a World Bank-
imposed debarment on an entity’s relationship with the IFC).   
 27.  The Bank referred 22, 22, and 23 cases to national authorities in fiscal years 2015, 
2014, and 2013, respectively, turning over evidence discovered during World Bank investi-
gations. See FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 52-54 (listing the referrals made in 
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practical level, debarment can complicate even private international busi-
ness transactions.  For instance, sophisticated business partners routinely 
conduct due diligence that utilizes public debarment lists.28  This can lead 
to questions from prospective business partners that are difficult for a de-
barred entity to answer in light of confidentiality that the Bank requires 
around its sanctions—with the result being, at times, lost business opportu-
nities.29  Sanctions also complicate corporate transactions, because of the 
uncertainty under existing Bank policies, procedures, and practice about the 
circumstances in which sanctions could extend to a purchaser or successor 
of a sanctioned entity.30  A debarment can complicate day-to-day opera-
fiscal year 2015); FY 14 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 47-50 (listing the referrals made 
in fiscal year 2014).  In addition to creating the possibility of criminal proceedings in certain 
instances, in at least one case, the Bank sanctions regime effectively supplanted the criminal 
justice system: a government recently forewent criminal sanctions against a corporation al-
together because “the act had [already] resulted in extensive reactions from the World 
Bank” and a corporate penalty combined with the sanctions “might have disproportionate 
consequences for the company.”  HR-2013-1394-A, No. 2012/2114, Norconsult (Supreme 
Court of Norway), http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/ Sum-
mary-of-Recent-Supreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-Decisions-2013
[https://perma.cc/A8WP-3FAW]. 
But the Bank has temporarily limited its referrals, pending the outcome of litigation in Can-
ada.  In 2011, INT provided information to Canadian authorities resulting from its investiga-
tion of SNC-Lavalin Group, Inc., which led to the criminal prosecution of several former 
employees in Canada. FY 15 Annual Update, supra note 17, at 15 n.1.  Lawyers for the 
charged employees subsequently requested the Bank’s records, but the Bank refused, insist-
ing on immunity based on its status as an international organization. See World Bank Group 
v. Wallace, 2014 ONSC 7449 (36315), at ¶¶ 33-34, 40, 64-65.  The Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice rejected the argument and ordered the World Bank Group to produce the docu-
ments, finding that the Bank had impliedly waived its immunities by volunteering the in-
formation to and cooperating with the authorities.  See FY 15 Annual Update, at 15 n.1.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada granted the Bank’s leave to appeal, and a decision is pending. Id.
During the pendency of this litigation, the Bank has limited its referrals to national authori-
ties.
 28.  Cf. Todd J. Canni, Debarment is No Longer Private World Bank Business: An Ex-
amination of the Bank’s Distinct Debarment Procedures Used for Corporate Procurements 
and Financed Projects, 40 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 147, 149 (2010) (“[T]he Bank’s debar-
ments have the potential to inflict far-reaching reputational and economic harm on contrac-
tors, ‘roughly the equivalent to Hawthorne’s scarlet letter.’”).
 29.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. XIII, § 13.06 (Apr. 15, 2012) (“Neither 
the Respondent (include any Affiliate thereof) nor the Bank shall disclose to, or discuss 
with, any third party any part of the record, or information relating thereto, except” for pur-
poses of obtaining legal counsel, compliance with a court order, or where the Bank deems 
disclosure necessary in accordance with policies and procedure).   
 30.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.04(c) (Apr. 15, 2012) (discuss-
ing the application of sanctions to successors and assigns); The World Bank Group’s Sanc-
tions Regime: Information Note (The World Bank, D.C.), at 9, 20–21 (noting that the Sanc-
tions Procedures allows affiliates of a respondent to be sanctioned); see also The World 
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶¶ 74–75 (2015) (considering 
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tions as well.  As one example, the circumstances in which the Bank would 
permit a debarred entity to participate in privately funded portions of a pro-
ject that may receive some Bank financing in the future are unpredictable.31
And though the consequences can be severe, the standard of proof to 
establish a Sanctionable Practice is relatively modest.  Citing the “adminis-
trative” character of its investigations, INT need only prove “that it is more 
likely than not that the alleged misconduct has occurred.”32  INT’s burden 
is “lower than the criminal standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’” and is 
instead “akin to a ‘balance of probabilities.’”33  No doubt this has contrib-
uted to a high rate of success in substantiating Sanctionable Practices.  In 
2014 and 2015, for example, the World Bank’s adjudicative body that de-
cides contested cases, known as the “Sanctions Board,” issued twenty deci-
sions that considered thirty nine separate allegations of Sanctionable Prac-
tices.  Thirty of the Sanctionable Practices alleged by INT (nearly 77%) 
were substantiated.  Twenty seven of the thirty six named entities or indi-
viduals (75%) were sanctioned in those decisions. 
What may be particularly surprising is the variety of conduct that can 
give rise to a Sanctionable Practice and how it can differ from analogous 
U.S. laws.  The recent explosion in FCPA enforcement and stepped-up in-
ternational anti-corruption enforcement, in general, have helped to sensitize 
many multinational companies to the risks of corrupt business practices.34
Although some World Bank sanctions cases involve traditional bribery 
schemes,35 the World Bank casts a much wider enforcement net.  Statisti-
cally speaking, the Bank is approximately six times more likely to scruti-
nize an entity for fraud rather than corruption.36
successor liability); The World Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, ¶¶ 28–
30 (2014) (same).   
 31.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.01(c) (Apr. 15, 2012) (declaring 
debarred entity ineligible for a Bank-financed contract or loan).
 32.  The World Bank, External Investigations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:2
2641983~menuPK:2452528~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.htm
l [https://perma.cc/5FHJ-FEYR]. 
 33.  Id.
 34.  See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, 
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES
PRACTICE PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-25, A-73–A-85 (2014) (discussing the recent increase 
in FCPA enforcement and multinational efforts to fight corruption).   
 35.  See, e.g., Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Sanctions Oxford Universi-
ty Press for Corrupt Practices Impacting Education Projects in East Africa (July 3, 2012) 
(noting “improper payments to government officials for two contracts to supply text books 
in relation to two World Bank-financed projects”).   
 36.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 13, at 28 
(graphing the percentage of cases and settlements the Bank enforced by type of sanctionable 
practice, showing fraud as 86% and corruption as 14%).  
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Given the Bank’s intense enforcement, the variety of conduct that can 
give rise to a violation, the relaxed burden for proving a violation, and the 
significant consequences of sanctions that can result, international business 
organizations, as well as legal and compliance professionals who work with 
multinational companies, should understand this new and evolving area and 
its potentially profound ramifications for individual companies.  This arti-
cle seeks to elucidate the World Bank’s integrity enforcement regime and 
endeavors to contribute to a fuller understanding of the legal concepts ar-
ticulated in the Sanctions Procedures.  In particular, the following analysis 
of these areas attempts to help furnish a richer and more dynamic concep-
tualization of the developing sanctions definitions, and also endeavors to 
draw analogies to more established legal concepts and enforcement re-
gimes—specifically, available analogues under U.S. law.  The World 
Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency itself has noted the need to look to generally 
accepted principles of law to develop the understanding of each Sanctiona-
ble Practice,37 and the Sanctions Board has considered general principles of 
law in deciding cases.38  The treatment below aims to play a role in under-
standing these legal concepts, which are so crucial to this active and grow-
ing enforcement regime. 
I. THE WORLD BANK SANCTIONS PROCESS
Entities that participate in World Bank-funded projects are subject to 
Bank rules by becoming parties to agreements that incorporate the Bank’s 
Anti-Corruption Guidelines, Procurement Guidelines, or Consultant Guide-
lines—documents that define Sanctionable Practices and set forth the obli-
 37.  See Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection 
with Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE 
WORLD BANK, at 5-6 (Nov. 15, 2010). (viewing general principles of law as a useful and 
legitimate source of law for the sanctions regime). 
 38.  See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 57, ¶ 8 
(“In the absence of guidance on how to define . . . exceptional circumstances under the Stat-
ute and Procedures, the Bank’s legislative history, or the Sanctions Board’s previous juris-
prudence, the Sanctions Board looked to general principles of law, as demonstrated by lead-
ing international and national practice, to inform its analysis as set out in Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 43.”); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 80, ¶ 
12 & n.6 (considering the governing rules and procedures at other international administra-
tive tribunals).  In other cases, however, the Sanctions Board has observed that the Sanc-
tions Board Statute and Sanctions Procedures “do not provide any basis on which to consid-
er a national law framework as controlling in the Bank’s sanctions proceedings, and . . . the 
scope of a respondent’s liability under the Bank’s administrative sanctions process may not 
be coextensive with the scope of its potential liability under national law.”  Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 65, ¶ 42 (2014) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 46 (2011) and 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 51 (2012)). 
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gations of borrowers and recipients of loan proceeds.39  The Procurement 
Guidelines and Consultant Guidelines apply to procurement actions under 
Bank loans and credits, and are incorporated into standard Bank bidding 
documents and contracts.40  In 2006, the Bank implemented a series of re-
forms to its sanctions process, including adopting the Anti-Corruption 
Guidelines, which expanded the sanctions regime to cover recipients of 
Bank funds other than consultants, suppliers, and contractors from whom 
goods and services are procured.41  Borrowers of Bank funds are required 
to include provisions in contracts with each recipient of loan proceeds that 
incorporate the Anti-Corruption Guidelines.42  Further, although the sanc-
tions regime is rooted in contract, the Sanctions Board has asserted juris-
diction over—and can debar—individual employees of an entity that was 
itself subject to the Guidelines by competing for or receiving a contract, 
even if the applicable Guidelines do not specifically refer to the possibility 
 39.  See Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Fi-
nanced by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants (“World Bank Anti-Corruption Guide-
lines”) ¶ 5 (Oct. 15, 2006 rev. Jan. 2011) (“These Guidelines apply to the Borrower and all 
other persons or entities which either receive Loan proceeds for their own use (e.g., ‘end 
users’), persons or entities such as fiscal agents which are responsible for the deposit or 
transfer of Loan proceeds . . . , and persons or entities which take or influence decisions re-
garding the use of Loan proceeds.”); Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-
Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrow-
ers (“World Bank Procurement Guidelines”) ¶ 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014) (requiring 
“that a clause be included in bidding documents and in contracts financed by a Bank loan, 
requiring bidders, suppliers and contractors, and their sub-contractors, agents, personnel, 
consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the Bank to inspect all accounts, rec-
ords, and other documents relating to the submission of bids and contract performance, and 
to have them audited by auditors appointed by the Bank”); Guidelines: Selection and Em-
ployment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Bor-
rowers (“World Bank Consultant Guidelines”) § 1.8 (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014) (“The prin-
ciples, rules, and procedures outlined in these Guidelines apply to all contracts for 
consulting services financed in whole or in part from Bank loans.”); see also The World 
Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, at 18 (“It is clear from this expansive 
formulation that the jurisdiction of the Bank’s sanctions regime essentially includes any and 
all actors involved in Bank financed procurement, other than the Borrower itself.”).  The 
World Bank has, with some exceptions, consistently defined the Sanctionable Practices 
across the different versions of the Anti-Corruption Guidelines, Procurement Guidelines, 
and Consultant Guidelines.  For ease of reference, this article refers to the Procurement 
Guidelines unless otherwise stated. 
 40.  See Mario A. Aguilar, Jit B.S. Gill & Livio Pino, Preventing Fraud and Corruption 
in World Bank Projects: A Guide for Staff (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank, D.C.) 8-10 (2000) (discussing the Procurement Guidelines 
and Consultant Guidelines that embed the Bank’s Anticorruption policy on procurement); 
World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines 3 (May 5, 2008) (describing the roles of Procure-
ment Guidelines and Consultant Guidelines). 
 41.  Id. at 11. 
 42.  World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 9(d). 
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of sanctioning individuals.43
Against a ten-year statute of limitations, sanctions can result “if at any 
time the Bank determines that [the] individual or entity has engaged in 
[Sanctionable Practices] in connection with [Bank-funded projects]”44—
typically during bidding, procurement, and execution of a Bank-funded 
project.  Again, the Sanctionable Practices have World Bank-specific defi-
nitions and application; one should not necessarily associate them with 
analogous national laws.  The Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank 
Group has noted, however, that it is sometimes appropriate for the Sanc-
tions Board to resort to “general principles of law” in resolving issues, giv-
en that the legal framework for the sanctions regime is “thin.”45
The World Bank’s process to sanction companies and individuals al-
leged to have acted improperly in connection with Bank-funded projects is 
described in and governed by several documents, among them the World 
Bank Sanctions Procedures (which describe the procedures to be followed 
in cases involving alleged Sanctionable Practices), the Sanctions Board 
Statute (which describes the operation and composition of the Bank’s adju-
dicative body that determines whether misconduct occurred and the appro-
priate sanction in contested cases), and the World Bank Sanctioning Guide-
lines (which provide guidance on the considerations that the Bank believes 
are relevant to sanctioning decisions).  The administrative nature of this 
system means that many of the due process safeguards available in sanc-
 43.  See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶ 29 
(2015) (recognizing that the Sanctions Board may assert jurisdiction over corporate officers, 
managers, and directors employed by a firm); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 28 (2014) (noting that the Bank can assert jurisdiction to sanction 
without the consent of or privity with a respondent). 
 44.  Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Program-for-
Results Financing, ¶ 7(d) (Feb. 1, 2012); see World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 
4.01(d) (Apr. 15, 2012) (“[T]he Evaluation Officer shall close the matter . . . if the accusa-
tions . . . pertain to (i) a Sanctionable Practice in connection with a contract the execution of 
which was completed more than ten (10) years prior to the date on which the Statement of 
Accusations and Evidence was submitted . . . or (ii) for all other cases, a Sanctionable Prac-
tice that took place more than ten (10) years prior to the date on which the Statement of Ac-
cusations and Evidence was submitted . . . .”).  Respondents sometimes have unsuccessfully 
challenged proceedings due to the passage of time.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, for 
example, the respondent moved to dismiss the proceedings due to the passage of more than 
seven years between the last alleged misconduct and the initiation of sanctions proceedings. 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 30 (2014).  The Sanctions Board determined that this 
did not warrant a summary dismissal, noting that the allegations were not barred by the ten-
year statute of limitations, but allowed the respondent to present arguments about the harm 
caused by the delay. Id.
 45.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, at 5 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
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tions proceedings are less substantial than those that accompany a more 
traditional judicial process.  The process includes the following basic as-
pects:
Complaint Intake and Investigations:  The sanctions process typically 
begins with receipt of a complaint by INT.  Headed by Leonard McCarthy, 
an experienced former South African prosecutor, INT’s mandate is to de-
tect, investigate, and seek sanctions with respect to allegations of Sanction-
able Practices in Bank-funded activities, including projects funded by 
members of the World Bank Group,46 as well as allegations of misconduct 
involving Bank staff.47  Because “INT has sole responsibility for selecting 
which matters are investigated, conducting objective fact-finding inquiries 
and initiating sanctions proceedings when it believes that it has uncovered 
sufficient evidence that a contractor has engaged in sanctionable miscon-
duct,”48 it is incredibly influential in setting the Bank’s sanctions agenda.  
Reporting directly to the Bank President, INT is composed of approximate-
ly 90 staff members from around the world with various legal, law en-
forcement, and forensic accounting backgrounds—arguably making it the 
world’s largest dedicated anti-corruption squad.49  Each year, INT receives 
hundreds of complaints, from inside and outside of the Bank.50  INT 
screens each complaint to help ensure it implicates a Sanctionable Practice 
in Bank-funded activities and is sufficiently serious to warrant an investiga-
tion.51  Based on more than 320 of such initial assessments during fiscal 
year 2015, INT opened 99 formal investigations, covering 86 countries and 
 46.  See The World Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, at 4 (“INT is 
charged with, among other things, investigating allegations and other indications that sanc-
tionable practices have occurred in connection with Bank Group-financed projects.”).  
 47.  The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 13 Facts & Figures (The World Bank, D.C.), at 
9.  The World Bank Group created the Department of Institutional Integrity in 2001, which 
was elevated to a Vice Presidency in 2008.
 48.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Of-
fice of Suspension and Debarment, D.C.) 2015, at 11.  
 49.  See Michael Diamant & Joseph F. Warin, Webcast-World Bank Sanctions and En-
forcement: Why You Need to Be Prepared (May 27, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/Pages/Webcast-World-Bank-Sanctions-and-Enforcement-Why-You-Need-to-
Be-Prepared.aspx [https://perma.cc/DP2W-8U6E] (presenting practical information on the 
World Bank Sanctions and Enforcement of Corruption). 
 50.  See, e.g., FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 30; FY 13 Annual Update supra
note 15, at 2, 5; The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 12 Annual Update (The World Bank, 
D.C.), at 32 (describing the complaints receives by the INT).
 51.  See FY 12 Annual Update supra note 50, at 32; The World Bank, External Investi-
gations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ 
ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:22641983~menuPK:2452528~p
agePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.html [https://perma.cc/VQX7-
7DYW] (explaining complaint intake process). 
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an array of industry sectors.52
While lacking investigative powers traditionally enjoyed by govern-
ment enforcement authorities, such as subpoena power, INT can leverage 
the cooperation of those under scrutiny, as well as Bank contractual audit-
rights provisions, to employ many traditional investigative techniques, such 
as interviews and document review.53  One of the Sanctionable Practices, 
obstruction, gives INT a powerful tool to induce cooperation, because it 
creates an independent basis to sanction entities that impede investigations, 
even if INT cannot substantiate the underlying allegation.  Further, INT is 
not constricted by the rules of evidence,54 and the standard of proof appli-
cable to INT investigations works to its advantage.  Operating under a 
more-likely-than-not standard, akin to a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard frequently found in civil cases,55 if INT finds sufficient evidence 
to conclude that a Sanctionable Practice occurred, it considers an allegation 
to be substantiated and will take further action.56  Although an INT investi-
 52.  FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 1, 6, 35.   
 53.  See INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements 
Fit Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System (The World Bank, D.C.) 2, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3B3J-8VHS]; (outlining purpose and scope of World Bank sanctions pro-
cess); David M. Nadler & Glenn T. Ware, The World Bank Implements New Sanctions Pro-
cedures, 53 THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR 6, Feb. 9, 2011 at 4 (commenting on new 
World Bank Sanctions procedures); The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency, Presenta-
tion to the ICC 9, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/65f602a2-a0f6-413a-beed-
d70f5d091a8f/282330/presentationmccarthy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P2Z-FPUT] (presenting 
the structure and process of the INT).  INT’s approach, which is administrative in nature but 
implicates important rights, can lead to complex discussions regarding the proper involve-
ment of defense counsel. See World Bank 2013 Phase I Sanctions Review Stakeholder Con-
sultation: Comments of the U.S. Defense Bar, 4 (Oct. 31, 2013), 
https://consultations.worldbank.org/Data/hub/files/consultation-template/consultation-
review-world-bank-group-sanctions-
systemopenconsultationtem-
plate/materials/us_defense_bar_comments_10_31_13_wb_sanctions_system_review_consul
tation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHF-ES7Y].  
 54.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, § 7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (“Any kind 
of evidence may form the basis of arguments presented in a sanctions proceeding . . . .”).  
The Bank does, however, respect the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product 
doctrines. Id. § 7.02. 
 55.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 45 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 56.  If an individual or entity engages in factually distinct incidents of misconduct, each 
separate incident may be considered separately and sanctioned on a cumulative basis; alter-
natively, this pattern of behavior may be considered an aggravating factor.  World Bank 
Sanctioning Guidelines § III (Jan. 1, 2011); see also The World Bank, External Investiga-
tions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION
/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:22641983~menuPK:2452528~pagePK:64168445~
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gation does not necessarily mean that sanctions will result, there is a high 
likelihood that if INT opens an investigation, it will find enough evidence 
to meet its thresholds.  For example, of the more than 220 investigations 
that INT completed in fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015, it found sufficient 
evidence of Sanctionable Practices more than 68% of the time.57  Part of 
this is attributable to the standard of proof, but INT also has nearly tripled 
its substantiation rate in recent years by selecting investigative targets more 
carefully.58  The percentage of substantiated investigations has dramatically 
increased over the last seven years:  FY09 (25.5%), FY10 (17.6%), FY11 
(45.8%), FY12 (52.2%), FY13 (67.4%), FY14 (61.8%), FY15 (74%).59
Before commencing sanctions proceedings, INT may first send the 
subject a “show-cause letter.”60  A show-cause letter could well be a com-
pany’s first indication that it is on INT’s radar, and the letter could arrive 
months after the project at issue is completed.  Similar to an SEC Wells no-
tice,61 a show-cause letter sets forth allegations and provides the target an 
opportunity to present a written response with arguments and evidence 
demonstrating why INT should not seek sanctions against it.  Although da-
ta are not publicly available regarding the efficacy of such responses, our 
experience has been that an effective response can help to narrow the alle-
gations and factual disputes.  Responding to the show-cause letter, howev-
er, can pose practical challenges, because INT is not obligated at this point 
to disclose evidence it possesses.62  A respondent company and its counsel 
piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.html [https://perma.cc/LT2L-YJE9] (“[T]he standard 
of proof is akin to a ‘balance of probabilities’ and therefore lower than the criminal standard 
of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) “Unsubstantiated” allegations, in contrast, are those that 
lack sufficient proof, while “unfounded” allegations are those for which INT concludes that 
the allegation wholly lacks basis.  See FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 31 (outlining 
external investigations of the World Bank). 
 57.  FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37. 
 58.  Id. at 35 (“INT continues to refine its selection process for matters going to full 
investigation and has devoted additional resources to more thorough preliminary screening 
of allegations before commencing a full investigation.”). 
 59.  FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 3, 5; FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, 
at 33; FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37.
 60.  INT is not required to issue a show-cause letter before initiating sanctions proceed-
ings. See Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 (Sanctions Case No.215), ¶ 34 (2015) (rejecting 
related challenges in cases where INT did not issue one). 
 61.  SEC rules provide that the SEC staff “may advise [persons who become involved 
in preliminary inquiries or formal investigations] of the general nature of the investigation, 
including the indicated violations . . . and the amount of time that may be available for pre-
paring and submitting [a written statement setting forth their views] prior to the presentation 
of a staff recommendation to the Commission for the commencement of an administrative 
or injunction proceeding.”  17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c).  
 62.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. III, § 3.02 (Apr. 15, 2012) (providing 
that INT must provide evidence along with the Statement of Accusations and Evidence).
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therefore may feel as if they are trying to prove a negative.  Further, the 
possible lack of factual predicate to the allegations may effectively force 
the respondent to provide a detailed response, possibly restricting its flexi-
bility in making arguments in its own defense later in the sanctions process.  
Indeed, the Sanctions Board may consider a statement made in a response 
to a show-cause letter as an admission.63
If INT substantiates an allegation upon conclusion of its investigation, 
it will draft a final investigation report.64  The report is provided to the 
Bank President and ultimately made publicly available in redacted form on 
the Bank’s website.65  In addition to producing the final investigative re-
port, if INT substantiates an allegation it will prepare a document called a 
Statement of Accusations and Evidence (“SAE”).66  This document is pre-
sented to the Bank’s Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer (“SDO”) 
and formally commences the Bank’s administrative sanctions process.67
The SAE can span hundreds of pages, identifies the alleged Sanctionable 
Practice(s) at issue, and summarizes the underlying facts and evidence, to-
gether with any exculpatory or mitigating evidence.68  In fiscal year 2015, 
 63.  See, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 52 
(Sanctions Case No. 134), ¶ 30 (2012) (“By the CEO’s own admission in responding to 
INT’s show-cause letter, ‘our primary motivation’ in using the agent to quickly secure the 
Bid Security was the timely submission of the Bid.”).
 64.  See FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 33 (detailing final investigation re-
ports).
 65.  Id.; The World Bank, External Investigations, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTDOII/0,,contentMDK:2
2641983~menuPK:7281670~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:588921,00.htm
l [https://perma.cc/R5YY-M9QR].   
 66.  FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 6 (describing SAE); Report on Functions, 
Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debar-
ment, D.C.) 2015, at 11.  The IFC and MIGA each have their own Evaluation and Suspen-
sion Officers. See The World Bank, Suspension and Debarment Officer / Evaluation and 
Suspension Officers, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ 
ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21272397~menuPK:36
01082~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/A7DH-XJSF] (listing Evaluation and Suspension Officers).   
 67.  Other members of the World Bank Group have their own Evaluation Officers 
(“EO”), who perform similar functions with respect to their own sanctions procedures.  See,
e.g., IFC Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01 (“[A] statement of accusations and evi-
dence . . . will be presented to the IFC Evaluation Officer within a maximum period of one 
year . . . .”); The World Bank, Sanctions Board Decision No. 76 (Sanctions No. 265) (2015) 
(considering a case brought under the IFC Sanctions Procedures in which the IFC EO rec-
ommended debarment with conditional release, but concluding that the Sanctions Board was 
without jurisdiction to consider the allegations because there lacked a sufficient nexus be-
tween the alleged misconduct and the project at issue).
 68.  See World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. III, § 3.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012) (explain-
ing referrals process to the IFC Evaluation Officer); World Bank Sanctions and Anti-
Corruption Efforts Panel Discussion 19 (Oct. 24, 2011).  In one decision in which the Sanc-
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INT submitted 29 SAEs to the SDO, fewer than the 45 SAEs it submitted 
in fiscal year 2014 but on par with the 33 and 25 SAEs submitted in 2013 
and 2012, respectively.69
Our clients frequently ask how long investigations last.  INT has 
tracked and reported on the average or median number of months it takes 
between opening a case and finalizing the investigative report for the past 
few years.  Although each case differs and these figures do not account for 
additional time spent engaging in settlement negotiations or challenging the 
allegations through the Bank’s sanctions system, INT’s reported data pro-
vide some insight into the typical pace of INT investigations:  FY10 (14.5-
month average),70 FY11 (17.1-month average),71 FY12 (11.5-month medi-
an),72 FY13 (16-month median),73 FY14 (12-month median),74 FY15 (13-
month average).75  Many investigations, however, last several years.76
Temporary Suspensions:  Under the Sanctions Procedures, the SDO 
may impose a temporary suspension, known as “Early Temporary Suspen-
sions,” before INT actually completes its investigation.77  The World Bank 
developed this mechanism in 2009 to address the risk that an entity remains 
eligible to bid on Bank-funded projects until it has been formally sanc-
tioned, even if evidence already suggests it committed a Sanctionable Prac-
tions Board determined that INT failed to timely present exculpatory evidence in the SAE, 
the Sanctions Board considered whether this failure “compromised the Respondents’ ability 
to mount a meaningful response to INT’s allegations.”  Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 ¶ 
36 (2015); see also The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63 
(Sanctions Case No.119, 124), ¶¶ 40–41 (2014) (same).  In another, the Sanctions Board 
avoided addressing the treatment of exculpatory evidence obtained from a respondent but 
not submitted into the record by INT—something the Sanctions Procedures do not specifi-
cally address—because the Sanctions Board determined that the evidence was not exculpa-
tory.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 70 (Sanctions No. 
206), ¶¶ 18–19 (2014). 
 69.  FY 15 Annual Update supra note 15, at 38.
 70.  The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 10 Annual Update, (World Bank Group, D.C.) at 
28.
 71.  The Integrity Vice Presidency FY 11 Annual Update, (World Bank Group, D.C.) at 
34.
 72.  FY 12 Annual Update, at 34. 
 73.  FY 13 Facts & Figures supra note 47, at 5. 
 74.  FY 14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 33. 
 75.  FY 15 Annual Update supra note 17, at 37. 
 76.  See Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 
36–49 (calculating the periods from the date of the earliest investigative activity to the date 
of the submission of the SAE). 
 77.  The World Bank, The World Bank Sanctions Procedures, Early Temporary Sus-
pension of Companies Involved in World Bank-Financed Projects,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/ETS_Announcement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HL93-Z2SD]. 
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tice.78  As noted above, the lifecycle of a case, from investigation to sanc-
tion, can run for several months, if not for years.  Now, the Sanctions Pro-
cedures provide that INT can request a temporary suspension from the 
SDO before concluding its investigation, which respondents are afforded 
an opportunity to contest,79 if it believes that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of a Sanctionable Practice and it will successfully com-
plete the investigation and prepare an SAE within one year.80  If the SDO 
agrees with INT that there is sufficient evidence and would recommend a 
period of debarment of at least two years for such misconduct, then the 
SDO is obligated to initiate the temporary suspension.81  A temporarily 
suspended entity is debarred from obtaining new Bank-funded business for 
a period of six months, which can be extended for an additional six 
months.82  Unlike normal suspensions, the cross-debarment agreement 
among MDBs does not apply to temporary suspensions.83  Thus far, this 
early temporary suspension mechanism has not been used often.84
“Tier One” of the Sanctions Process:  The first level of the sanctions 
process involves the SDO evaluating the SAE to determine if it is sufficient 
to support the allegations.85  Since March 2007, Pascale Hélène Dubois, a 
lawyer by training, has served as the World Bank SDO.86  Applying the 
same more-likely-than-not standard, the SDO “analyzes the claims made 
and the evidence furnished in the SAE, and looks carefully at whether the 
claims made by INT adhere to the World Bank’s legal framework.”87  This 
 78.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 12–13; FY
14 Annual Update supra note 15, at 3.
 79.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.02 (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 80.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 81.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.01(c) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 82.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. II, § 2.04(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 83.  See Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 
15 (discussing temporary suspensions). 
 84.  See id. at 24 (graphing number of firms/individuals temporarily suspended by 
OSD). 
 85.  Id. at 10–11. 
 86.  See Pascale Hélène Dubois, Biography, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/3601045-1373561382853/Pascale_Dubois_CV_
(as_of_August_20,_2014).pdf [https://perma.cc/JEN3-7ARU].  The other members of the 
World Bank Group have their own Evaluation and Suspension Officers.  See The World 
Bank, Suspension and Debarment Officer / Evaluation and Suspension Officers,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORG
UNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,contentMDK:21272397~menuPK:3601082~pagePK:6416844
5~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html [https://perma.cc/ZAH8-G6YP] (naming 
those Officers).
 87.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 12. 
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review lasts on average two months.88  If the SDO finds insufficient evi-
dence to support one or more of the allegations, she remands the case to 
INT, at which point INT can drop the unsupported charges or investigate 
further and then send revisions to the SDO.89  Historically, in such instanc-
es, INT has taken an average of approximately four months to provide a re-
vised submission to the SDO.90  As an independent function reporting di-
rectly to the Bank President, the SDO “serves as an impartial check and 
balance on the work of the World Bank’s investigators and endeavors to 
ensure a fair and objective process for all parties involved.”91  Indeed, ac-
cording to a report recently issued by the Bank’s Office of Suspension and 
Debarment, the SDO has found insufficient evidence for at least one allega-
tion in more than one-third of cases she reviewed.92
If the SDO finds sufficient evidence supporting a Sanctionable Prac-
tice, she will issue a document to the entity called a Notice of Sanctions 
Proceedings.93  The Notice will include the SAE, a recommended sanction, 
and instructions about how to contest the accusations.94  Further, if the rec-
ommended sanction includes a period of debarment of more than six 
months, the respondent is automatically suspended pending the conclusion 
of the proceedings, which will typically be the case.95
After delivery of the Notice, the respondent has thirty days to provide 
the SDO with a written “Explanation” as to why the Notice should be with-
drawn or the recommended sanction modified.96  Because the Notice actu-
ally includes INT’s evidence, the Explanation presents an important oppor-
tunity for effective advocacy to challenge the evidence, theories of liability, 
and the sanction.  In fact, the SDO can (1) “withdraw the Notice upon con-
cluding that there is a manifest error or other clear basis for supporting a 
finding of insufficiency of evidence against the Respondent” or (2) “revise 
the recommended sanction in light of evidence or arguments as to mitigat-
ing factors presented by the Respondent.”97  The Notice must attach the 
SAE, and presents a Respondent’s first opportunity to contest the allega-
 88.  Id. at 48. 
 89.  Id. at 12. 
 90.  Id. at 48. 
 91.  Id. at 11. 
 92.  Id. at 11, 30.  However, in 95% of cases, the SDO has determined that there was 
sufficient evidence for at least one of the claims made by INT. Id. at 30.
 93.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 94.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012). 
 95.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.02(a) (Apr. 15, 2012); see Report on 
Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 23 (presenting overall 
OSD case management statistics). 
 96.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.02(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 97.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.03(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
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tions before the SDO.  It thus is somewhat surprising that only about one-
third of respondents have submitted Explanations in response to Notices.98
This may be attributable historically to respondents that are unrepresented 
by counsel or unfamiliar with the sanctions process. 
In addition to submitting an Explanation, the respondent has ninety 
days after delivery of the Notice to appeal the case to the World Bank’s 
Sanctions Board.99  Otherwise, the SDO’s recommended sanction “shall en-
ter immediately into force,”100 and it will be published on the World Bank’s 
public website.  Most cases end at this level; historically, only forty percent 
of respondents have appealed to the Sanctions Board.101  And according to 
a recent review by the Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency, of the respondents 
that did not appeal to the Sanctions Board, more than 90% of the cases in-
volved respondents that simply failed to respond at all to the Notice.102
“Tier Two” of the Sanctions Process:  The Sanctions Board is com-
posed of seven members, including four external members and three senior 
Bank officials, each serving three-year terms.103  Its external members are a 
diverse and impressive group and currently include the first woman Justice 
and President of the Supreme Court of Brazil, a former Judge of the Consti-
tutional Court of South Africa, and the former General Counsel of the In-
ter-American Development Bank.104  A respondent initiates an appeal by 
submitting a written response to the allegations and recommended sanc-
tion.105  Upon request of the respondent or INT, or upon decision of the 
Sanctions Board Chair, “the Sanctions Board will hold a hearing on the ac-
cusations against the Respondent.”106  Hearings are intended to be infor-
mal—with a presentation by INT of its case, a presentation by the respond-
ent of its case, and a reply by INT—and limited to arguments and evidence 
 98.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, at 15 
n.35; see also The World Bank Group: World Bank Sanctions and Anti-Corruption Efforts 
Panel Discussion 22 (Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that the SDO receives an Explanation in only 
28% of cases) (on file with author). 
 99.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. V, § 5.01(a) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 100.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IV, § 4.04 (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 101.  Report on Functions, Data and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, supra note 66, 31 
(2014).
 102.  Frank Fariello & Giovanni Bo, The World Bank Group Sanctions System and Ac-
cess to Justice for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, 5 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW
at 424. 
 103.  World Bank Sanctions Board Statute, art. V, ¶ 5 (Sept. 15, 2010).   
 104.  The World Bank, Sanctions Board Members, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:21272308~menuPK:3601081~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601
046,00.html [https://perma.cc/LY9U-9EWH] (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).
 105.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. V, § 5.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 106.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VI, § 6.01 (Apr. 15, 2012).   
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in the written submissions filed with the SDO and/or the Sanctions Board, 
evidence relating to mitigating or aggravating factors, questions from the 
Sanctions Board, and limited opportunities for testimony.107  The Sanctions 
Board conducts de novo review of cases appealed to it based on the record 
and renders a final decision about whether a sanction should be imposed.108
Applying the same more-likely-than-not standard, if the Sanctions Board 
finds that the respondent engaged in Sanctionable Practices, it must impose 
sanctions.109  The Sanctions Board also issues written decisions, and it be-
gan publishing new decisions on the Bank’s public website in December 
2011.110
Sanctions Board decisions offer important insights about the Sanctions 
Board’s approach to evidence.  First, even if no single piece of evidence, 
standing alone, suffices to show misconduct, the cumulative weight of evi-
dence may do so.111  This approach was apparent in a decision in which the 
Sanctions Board found that a director’s silence during a meeting by itself 
failed to establish acquiescence in the offering of a bribe, but was sufficient 
“when viewed together with evidence of the [director’s] statements in a 
[later] June 2006 meeting, and – most importantly – the Director’s contin-
ued silence during email negotiations for the potential reallocation of Con-
tract proceeds.”112  Second, the Sanctions Board generally discounts, but 
does not necessarily preclude, witness testimony of business competitors or 
even accomplices.113  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, representatives 
 107.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VI, § 6.03(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 108.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012, at 3.   
 109.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VIII, § 8.01(b) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 110.  INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit 
Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System 3, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3J-32ZB]; The 
World Bank, Sanctions Board Decisions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:23059612~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/9H6Q-UCGE] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
 111.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 28 (2012). 
 112.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 34 (2012). 
 113.  See Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 39 (2012) (“In assessing the weight of wit-
ness statements, the Sanctions Board takes into account all relevant factors bearing on the 
witness’s credibility, including whether the witness is a business competitor and whether 
such witness may have been involved in any sanctionable practices.  The fact that testimony 
comes from a competitor may discount its value, depending on the circumstances, but will 
not necessarily preclude its use.  Similarly, a witness’s own involvement in the misconduct 
at issue should be considered, but it would not necessarily preclude use of that witness’s tes-
timony or even primary reliance upon it, where appropriate.”).  In Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 1, the Sanctions Board noted that confidential witness statements from competitors are 
“significantly discounted” if INT inexplicably withholds such evidence from the respondent.
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of a firm provided testimony to INT regarding a payment scheme.114  The 
Sanctions Board noted that the firm’s status as a competitor to the respond-
ent and its own potential involvement in corruption “call[ed] for extra scru-
tiny of [their] reliability as witnesses.”115  Further diminishing the competi-
tor’s credibility was the fact that INT interviewed the representatives 
together, which the Sanctions Board observed “may compromise the can-
dor of each individual’s testimony, and does not permit for cross-checking 
of each witness’s separate statement against other witnesses’ statements.”116
In such circumstances, the Sanctions Board frequently looks for documen-
tary evidence to corroborate witness testimony.117  In Sanctions Board De-
cision No. 50, for example, the Sanctions Board found that a representa-
tive’s handwritten meeting notes and subsequent email correspondence 
supported the witness’s credibility.118  Indeed, the Sanctions Board has 
even primarily relied on the testimony of a witness involved in the bribery 
scheme at issue where the witness provided “detailed, candid admissions 
against [his] self-interest, which were corroborated by contemporaneous 
documentation and other witnesses.”119
Respondents have had some success before the Sanctions Board.  In 
the Sanctions Board’s first five years of existence, for example, fifty-one 
respondents had appeals decided by the Sanctions Board; fifteen (twenty-
nine percent) ultimately received no sanction.120  Further, even where it 
finds culpability, the Sanctions Board often imposes a period of debarment 
that is shorter than what is recommended by the SDO.121  This is partly a 
BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 34 (citing Sanctions Board De-
cision No. 1, ¶ 7 (2007)).  Notably, this is the only decision in which the Sanctions Board 
found insufficient evidence of a Corrupt Practice.   
 114.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012). 
 115.  Id.
 116.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012).  Also, as discussed above, the Sanc-
tions Board noted that the weight of the witnesses’ testimony was further compromised by 
the fact that INT only proffered summary interviews (as opposed to verbatim transcripts) 
that were not reviewed and signed by the interviewees. Id.
 117.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012) (justifying extra scrutiny of 
witnesses because of their improper arrangements with Implementing Agency); The World 
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 41, ¶ 32 (2010).
 118.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 40 (2012).  
 119.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 41, ¶ 32 (2010)).  
 120.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 21. 
 121.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 65, ¶¶ 2, 86 (2014) (describing how the 
SDO recommended conditional debarments of four years and two years, respectively, and 
the Sanctions Board imposed a two-year conditional debarment and letter of reprimand, re-
spectively); The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶¶ 4, 89 
(2013) (describing how the SDO recommended a conditional debarment of three years, but 
the Sanctions Board imposed a one-year conditional debarment).
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result of the period of any temporary suspension already served.  The Sanc-
tions Procedures instruct the Sanctions Board to consider this as a factor in 
determining the appropriate sanction.122  As noted above, some respondents 
will have been temporarily suspended pending the conclusion of INT’s in-
vestigation or automatically suspended following the SDO’s review, and it 
takes an average of six to eight months from filing the appeal to the Sanc-
tions Board’s decision.123
Settlements:  Companies and enforcement authorities alike often favor 
settlements over the time, cost, and uncertainty inherent in the adversarial 
process,124 and the World Bank’s sanctions process is no exception.  Start-
ing in 2010, the World Bank has offered a settlement possibility through 
what it calls a Negotiated Resolution Agreement (“NRA”).125  The World 
Bank allows that a “settlement may be pursued at any stage of an investiga-
tion or sanctions proceeding.”126  These agreements replace formal sanc-
tions proceedings and allow the respondent and INT to negotiate an agreed-
upon sanction.  Many of the terms contained in NRAs might vary, but they 
generally require certain key terms.  For instance, an NRA likely will con-
tain an admission of culpability, compliance conditions (such as an obliga-
tion to improve a corporate compliance program in accordance with the 
World Bank’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines),127 imposition of a compli-
ance monitor, and obligations to cooperate with INT in various respects 
during the period of sanction.  Although INT drafts and negotiates NRAs, 
before becoming effective, they must be approved by the Bank’s General 
Counsel and reviewed by the SDO.128  NRAs represent only a fraction of 
 122.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.02(h) (Apr. 15, 2012).   
 123.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 21. 
 124.  See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Melissa Farrar, 2014 Year-
End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ments, SECURITIES REGULATION & LAW REPORT, 47 SRLR 332 (Feb. 16, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Warin_Diamant_Farrar-2014-Year-
End-Update-on-NPAs-and-DPAs-BNA-2.16.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/83ZS-2A2G].   
 125.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 20.   
 126.  INT, World Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit 
Within the World Bank Group’s Sanctions System 3, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTDOII/Resources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NQQ-29JQ]. 
 127.  The Integrity Compliance Guidelines describe a non-exclusive set of “standards, 
principles and components commonly recognized by many institutions and entities as good 
governance and anti-fraud and corruption practices” which must be adequately implemented 
before debarment or conditional non-debarment is lifted. The World Bank, The Summary of 
World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTDOII/Resources/Integrity_Compliance_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/APK6-ASAG].   
 128.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. XI, § 11.02 (Apr. 15, 2012); INT, World 
Bank Group Settlements: How Negotiated Resolution Agreements Fit Within the World 
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the cases resolved by INT, with eleven in fiscal year 2011, sixteen in fiscal 
year 2012, eight in fiscal year 2013, six in fiscal year 2014, and eleven in 
fiscal year 2015.  Nevertheless, they have been used to resolve some of the 
Bank’s highest-profile investigations.129
Sanctions:  The World Bank—whether the SDO or the Sanctions 
Board—can impose five types of possible sanctions:  (1) letter of repri-
mand, (2) debarment for a definite or indefinite period, (3) conditional non-
debarment, (4) debarment with conditional release, and (5) restitution.130  A 
series of enumerated aggravating or mitigating factors can increase or de-
crease the sanction.131
REPRIMAND. In cases of “truly minor misconduct or peripheral in-
volvement,” such as where a party commits an isolated lack of oversight, a 
public letter of reprimand may be appropriate.132
DEBARMENT.  The World Bank will debar a party where “no appre-
ciable purpose would be served by imposing conditions for release but de-
terrence requires some period of debarment,” after which the debarment is 
automatically lifted.133  The Sanctioning Guidelines identify situations in 
which “there would be no reasonable purpose served by imposing condi-
tions” as including instances where the sanctioned party already has in 
place a strong compliance program, where the Sanctionable Practice in-
Bank Group’s Sanctions System 4, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/ Re-
sources/NoteOnSettlementProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP29-KFQV]. 
 129.  FY 14 Annual Update, at 34; FY 15 Annual Update at 38; Report on Functions, Da-
ta and Lessons Learned 2007-2013, (The World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment, 
D.C.) 2015, at 23; Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Debars SNC-Lavalin Inc. 
and its Affiliates for 10 years (Apr. 17, 2013) (“The debarment is part of a Negotiated Reso-
lution Agreement . . . .”); Press Release, Enforcing Accountability: World Bank Debars Al-
stom Hydro France, Alstom Network Schweiz AG, and their Affiliates (Feb. 22, 2012).   
 130.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012, at 4-5; 
World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. IX, § 9.01 (Apr. 15, 2012). 
 131.  Aggravating factors include the severity of the misconduct (one to five year in-
crease), the harm caused by the misconduct (one to five year increase), interference with 
INT’s investigation (one to three year increase), and a past history of adjudicated miscon-
duct (ten year increase).  Mitigating factors include having a minor role in the misconduct 
(up to twenty-five percent decrease), taking voluntary corrective action (up to fifty percent 
decrease, or more in exceptional circumstances), and cooperating with the investigation (up 
to thirty-three percent decrease, or more in exceptional circumstances).  World Bank Sanc-
tioning Guidelines §§ I, IV, V (Jan. 1, 2011).
 132.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 5; World 
Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(D) (Jan. 1, 2011); see, e.g., The World Bank Sanctions 
Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 67 (2014) (describing the appropriateness of a letter 
of reprimand). 
 133.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 4. 
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volved isolated acts of personnel who have been terminated, and where the 
proposed debarment is for a relatively short period.134
DEBARMENT WITH CONDITIONAL RELEASE.  Under the Sanctioning 
Guidelines, the baseline sanction for all Sanctionable Practices is a three-
year debarment with conditional release, which means that the debarred en-
tity will be released from sanction only after it has satisfied certain condi-
tions.  Conditions typically include the implementation or improvement of 
a satisfactory corporate compliance program.135  The Bank’s Integrity 
Compliance Office, which sits within INT but is administratively separate 
from the investigations function, is tasked with monitoring implementation 
and deciding whether the conditions have been satisfied.136
CONDITIONAL NON-DEBARMENT. Here, by contrast, a party is not de-
barred so long as it complies with certain conditions.  Conditional non-
debarment may be appropriate for parties that are affiliated with a respond-
ent and were not directly involved in the misconduct but have some re-
sponsibility or have demonstrated that they “have taken comprehensive 
corrective measures and that such other mitigating factors apply . . . so as to 
justify non-debarment.”137
RESTITUTION. Restitution and other financial remedies “may be used 
in exceptional circumstances, including those involving fraud in contract 
execution where there is a quantifiable amount to be restored to the client 
country or project.”138
II. SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES
The Procurement Guidelines define the five Sanctionable Practices, 
and the Sanctions Board has further refined their meanings and application, 
and developed precedent by applying them to specific factual circumstanc-
es.  Much like the written opinions of national courts of law, Sanctions 
Board decisions provide factual findings, summarize the various arguments 
and factual assertions of the parties, apply the applicable standards and ana-
lyze their merits, and reach conclusions, sometimes even including a dis-
senting opinion.139  Not all Sanctions Board decisions, however, are availa-
 134.  World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(B) (Jan. 1, 2011). 
 135.  Id.  Starting punishment for all Sanctionable Practices at the same level—for in-
stance, a bribe to obtain a project versus a non-intentional, immaterial inaccuracy in bid ma-
terials—may lead to results that cause entities that engage in objectively less culpable con-
duct to question the calibration of the process.   
 136.  Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process 
and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 16–17. 
 137.  World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(C) (Jan. 1, 2011).   
 138.  World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § II(F) (Jan. 1, 2011).   
 139.  See Sanctions Board Decision No. 81 (2015) (D. Robitaille dissenting op.) (repre-
2016] SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES AT THE WORLD BANK 1009 
ble to the public.  Of the seventy-five Board decisions rendered through the 
end of 2014, thirty-four had been fully published, with an additional eight 
decisions published in 2015.140  Twenty more decisions, issued before De-
cember 2011, are summarized in the Sanctions Board Law Digest.141  Rely-
ing on available Sanctions Board decisions, the following subsections ana-
lyze both the required elements of each Sanctionable Practice and the types 
of evidence the Sanction Board has considered in assessing culpability.  In 
addition to providing a synthesis and analysis of the contours of each Sanc-
tionable Practice, this section draws parallels to more established laws and 
regulations in an effort to develop this relatively new area of law. 
A. Obstructive Practice 
The various versions of the Procurement Guidelines have defined an 
Obstructive Practice to encompass two types of behavior: 
• “[D]eliberately destroying, falsifying, altering, or concealing 
of evidence material to the investigation or making false 
statements to investigators in order to materially impede a 
Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, 
coercive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or 
intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its 
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from 
pursuing the investigation”; or 
• “[A]cts intended to materially impede the exercise of the 
Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under [a 
clause required to] be included in bidding documents and in 
contracts financed by a Bank loan, requiring bidders, suppliers 
and contractors, and their subcontractors, agents, personnel, 
consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the Bank 
to inspect all accounts, records, and other documents relating 
to the submission of bids and contract performance, and to 
senting an example of a dissenting opinion).  Article XIV of the Sanctions Board Statute and 
§ 20(1) of the Sanctions Procedures provide that Sanctions Board decisions are final and 
unappealable.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 80, ¶ 5 (2015).  Nevertheless, the Sanctions 
Board may recognize exceptional circumstances, such as newly discovered evidence, allow-
ing it to reconsider a final decision. Id.
 140.  The World Bank, Sanction Board Decisions, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTOFFEVASUS/0,,conte
ntMDK:23059612~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3601046,00.html
[https://perma.cc/EL34-PKCX] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).   
 141.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 25-32. 
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have them audited by auditors appointed by the Bank.”142
The precedent regarding Obstructive Practices is limited.  As of the 
publication of the Law Digest in October 2011, the Sanctions Board had 
not reviewed an obstruction case.143  Since then, however, the Sanctions 
Board has issued two publicly available opinions that consider Obstructive 
Practices.144  Further, although the creation of Obstructive Practices as a 
Sanctionable Practice in 2006 suggests that it was intended as a standalone 
deterrent to prevent firms from so severely obstructing an investigation that 
no other Sanctionable Practice could be proven,145 the Sanctions Board has 
not yet reviewed a case in which the sole allegation is that a respondent en-
gaged in an Obstructive Practice—in these cases, another Sanctionable 
Practice was instead the core allegation.  Five opinions review obstructive 
behavior that has been characterized by INT as an aggravating factor—
rather than an independent Sanctionable Practice—that should influence 
the severity of the sanction imposed.  Though an Obstructive Practice is a 
standalone Sanctionable Practice, interference with INT’s investigation re-
mains one of the enumerated aggravating factors in the Sanctioning Guide-
lines, and can lead to a one-to-three-year increase in the sanction. 
The definition of Obstructive Practices in the Procurement Guidelines 
is similar to that of the “interference with investigative process” aggravat-
ing factor present in the Sanctioning Guidelines, but differs from it in an 
important way:  like Obstructive Practices, which include “acts intended to 
materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights,” 
the aggravating factor applies to “acts intended to materially impede the 
exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of audit.”  The language of the ag-
gravating factor also includes, however, “acts intended to materially im-
pede . . . the Bank’s . . . access to information.”146  Notably, the Anti-
Corruption Guidelines define an Obstructive Practice consistent with the 
Sanctioning Guidelines’ aggravating factor—as “acts intended to materially 
impede the exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of audit or access to 
information.”147  Despite the different definitions, the aggravating factor 
cases provide additional insight into the interpretation of Obstructive Prac-
 142.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines §§ 1.16(a)(v)(bb), 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011 rev. July 
2014).
 143.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 22.   
 144.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 60 (2013); The 
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 77 (2015).
 145.  See Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and 
Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 at 5 (informing 
borrowers of reforms).   
 146.  World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § IV(C) 1 (Jan. 11, 2011).   
 147.  World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011).
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tices.  Of course, in these cases INT has made a decision to charge the be-
havior as only an aggravating factor, suggesting some level of discretion. 
Notably, one of the Sanctions Board’s two Obstructive Practices deci-
sions found that INT failed to present sufficient evidence.  In Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 77, the principal allegation was that the respondent en-
gaged in fraud by submitting allegedly false documents in a proposal.148
The respondent argued that the allegedly false submission should not be at-
tributed to it because it was made by an unauthorized individual.149  In sup-
port of its defense, the respondent submitted two power-of-attorney docu-
ments that it had given to the individual for other matters and pointed to 
differences in the “alleged” signature on the allegedly false documents and 
those on the powers of attorney.150  Believing that the so-presented power-
of-attorney documents were actually themselves fabricated, however, INT 
alleged that the respondent “engaged in an obstructive practice by deliber-
ately fabricating two documents constituting material evidence in order to 
impede INT’s investigation.”151
The Sanctions Board confirmed that it would analyze Obstructive 
Practices similarly to how it reviews the “interference with investigative 
process” aggravating factor and set out the following two elements:  INT 
must show that it is more likely than not that (1) the respondent deliberately 
falsified evidence, and (2) that is material to the investigation in order to 
materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a [Sanctionable 
Practice].”152
In finding that INT failed to meet its burden on the first element, the 
Sanctions Board noted that INT had not presented any evidence that the 
documents were fabricated nor anything to suggest any indicia of inauthen-
ticity on the face of the documents.153  Nor did the Sanctions Board itself 
see any such indicia, observing that the documents appeared to have origi-
nal stamps and signatures.154  Because INT did not satisfy the first element, 
the Sanctions Board did not need to consider whether the documents were 
 148.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 77, ¶ 8 (2015). 
 149.  Id. at ¶ 17.
 150.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
 151.  Id. at ¶ 8.
 152.  Id. at ¶ 38.  Although the Sanctions Board did not do so, adopting an alternative 
approach would have been to divide the second element into two sub-elements—(a) the evi-
dence is material to the investigation and (b) was deliberately destroyed, falsified, altered, or 
concealed in order to materially impede a Bank investigation.  The Sanctions Board’s brief 
analysis of the second prong does consider separately whether the falsified evidence was 
material to the investigation, and then whether it was falsified in order to materially impede 
a Bank investigation. See id. ¶ 43 (stating that the Sanctions Board need not consider 
whether falsification was intended to materially impede the investigation).   
 153.  Id. at ¶ 41. 
 154.  Id.
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material to the Bank’s investigation or whether any falsification was in-
tended to materially impede the investigation.155
In the second Obstructive Practices decision, the Sanctions Board 
concluded that the intentional deletion of documents relevant to an INT in-
quiry was sanctionable.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, INT alleged, 
among other things, that certain respondents “engaged in obstructive prac-
tices by deleting email correspondence relevant to INT’s investigation.”156
In particular, INT alleged that, in anticipation of INT’s arrival for an audit, 
a manager intentionally deleted emails showing that someone had received 
confidential information from a procurement advisor regarding contracts 
for a Bank-financed project.  The respondent admitted that the emails were 
deleted before INT’s audit despite understanding that they could be rele-
vant to the audit, but argued that the deletion had no material negative ef-
fect on INT’s investigation.157  Nevertheless, the Sanctions Board found 
sufficient evidence.  The timing of the deletions suggested that they were 
intended to impede the investigation, and the Sanctions Board observed 
that “at least some [of the deleted] emails related to [the respondent’s] 
communications with the Procurement Advisor and therefore were material 
to the investigation.”158
The Sanctions Board, in the aggravating-factor cases, has declined to 
find aggravation absent evidence that the spoliation was intentional.  In 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, INT again claimed that the respondents 
interfered with its investigation by deliberately destroying emails.159  Here, 
however, the respondents claimed that a technical issue caused the uninten-
tional loss of emails.  Although skeptical of the timing of the email loss, the 
Sanctions Board concluded that the record lacked “sufficient evidence . . . 
that any of the Respondents instructed or participated in any deliberate de-
struction or concealment of evidence.”160
 155.  Id. at ¶ 43. 
 156.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 12 (2013). 
 157.  Id. at ¶ 104. 
 158.  Id. at ¶ 105.  Notably, the SDO in this case had “recognized the alleged obstruction 
to be temporary and de minimis and largely outweighed by the significant cooperation that 
the relevant Respondents provided to INT.” Id. at ¶ 104.  The Sanctions Board, however, 
neither expounded on its holding nor explained why it departed from the SDO’s assessment.  
In contrast to the SDO, the Sanctions Board disregarded the respondents’ cooperation with 
INT in this analysis, noting that “such cooperation could be mitigating but not exculpatory.”  
Id. at ¶ 105. 
 159.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, ¶ 12 (2013). 
 160.  Id. at ¶ 38.  INT also asserted that the respondents made misleading statements 
about the supposed destruction.  Because the Sanctions Board did not find it “more likely 
than not that the emails were deliberately destroyed, it conclude[d] that the Respondents’ 
alternative explanations regarding the missing emails d[id] not warrant aggravation as false 
statements to INT.” Id. at ¶ 39.
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On its face, the definition of Obstructive Practices under the World 
Bank Procurement Guidelines should not allow for culpability when no 
contractual provision grants INT a right to inspect or audit.  Again, the def-
inition prohibits acts “intended to materially impede the exercise of the 
Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under [a clause required to] 
be included in bidding documents and in contracts financed by a Bank loan, 
requiring bidders, suppliers and contractors, and their subcontractors, 
agents, personnel, consultants, service providers, or suppliers, to permit the 
Bank to inspect all accounts, records, and other documents relating to the 
submission of bids and contract performance, and to have them audited by 
auditors appointed by the Bank.”161  But the definition of Obstructive Prac-
tices under the World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines may allow for such 
culpability, covering “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the 
Bank’s contractual rights of audit or access to information.”162  The latter 
three words can be read either to suggest that culpability can attach inde-
pendent of any contractual right of audit, where general “access to infor-
mation” has been obstructed, or that a contractual right of audit is a prereq-
uisite.  The 2006 report establishing Obstructive Practices supports the 
former interpretation.  It notes that Obstructive Practices would “provide[] 
a means for enforcing the Bank’s third-party rights and a mechanism for 
discouraging firms from non-cooperation in circumstances where there are 
no contractual rights or where those rights have lapsed.”163  If it confronts 
an Obstructive Practices case under the World Bank Anti-Corruption 
Guidelines, the Sanctions Board could easily disagree with this position, 
however, because it would render the “contractual rights of audit” language 
in the definition practically redundant. 
Aggravating-factor opinions offer some help in parsing the language, 
and have generally focused on the specific scope of the Bank’s audit rights 
rather than giving the phrase “access to information” the broadest possible 
meaning.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, INT alleged that one of the 
respondents impeded the Bank’s audit by refusing to provide INT access to 
joint venture correspondence and other documents.164  The Sanctions Board 
concluded that INT failed to establish that the respondent’s narrow inter-
pretation of the Bank’s audit rights under the contract constituted deliberate 
 161.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines §§ 1.16(a)(v)(bb), 1.16(e) (Jan. 2011, rev. 
July 2014).
 162.  World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011) 
(emphasis added).
 163.  Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanc-
tioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 at 5(emphasis add-
ed).
 164.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶¶ 16, 35 (2014). 
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interference.165  Had it read the definition of the aggravating factor more 
broadly, the Sanctions Board could have found aggravation warranted 
based on the respondent’s refusal to provide INT with “access to infor-
mation.”  But the Sanctions Board fit the respondent’s obligations to the 
scope of the Bank’s audit rights.  Because the respondent refused to pro-
vide documents outside the scope of the Bank’s audit rights, no deliberate 
interference occurred.  This outcome is logical given that the entire sanc-
tions regime at the World Bank is rooted in contract.  Again, to hold other-
wise would render audit clauses practically unnecessary. 
Likewise, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, INT argued that the re-
spondents deserved an enhanced sanction for interfering with and obstruct-
ing its investigation.  INT argued that the respondents impeded the Bank’s 
audit rights by denying INT access to relevant information.166  The re-
spondents countered that the audit rights did not encompass information 
that pre-dated the signing of the relevant contract and objected to INT’s in-
quiries into earlier events.  The Sanctions Board sided with INT, but, im-
portantly, did so by relying on an expansive reading of the Bank’s audit 
rights under the contract (as opposed to some general right to investigate).  
It interpreted the audit clause to require the respondents to allow the Bank 
to inspect all accounts and records related to the services provided in the 
contract.  The Sanctions Board determined that this language covered rele-
vant pre-contract activity.167
The same reasoning, but a different outcome, is found in Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 71, in which INT alleged that the respondent impeded 
the Bank’s audit rights.168  The respondent here also argued that “INT’s au-
dit request was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of INT’s rights.”169
Because the record did not contain any evidence “that would have clarified 
the scope of INT’s request and supported INT’s allegation,”170 the Sanc-
tions Board found no basis for aggravation.  Here, the Sanctions Board 
could not properly assess the request to determine if it fell within the scope 
of the Bank’s audit rights. 
Beyond access to documents, the Sanctions Board also has considered 
the application of interference to situations involving INT’s access to em-
ployees.  The scope of INT’s authority in this area is hotly contested.  In 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, INT argued for interference as an aggra-
vating factor alleging that it met with the respondent’s representatives three 
 165.  Id. at ¶ 103.
 166.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶¶ 13, 15(iii), 61 (2013). 
 167.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 168.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 71, ¶ 88 (2014). 
 169.  Id.
 170.  Id.
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times but they repeatedly refused to answer questions about documents rel-
evant to the investigation.171  The Sanctions Board concluded that aggrava-
tion was not warranted, because “INT [did] not allege that the Respondent 
engaged in any overt acts that interfered with INT’s investigation, which 
are the types of acts that the Sanctioning Guidelines suggest would warrant 
aggravation under this factor,” and because “the record reveals at least a 
certain degree of responsiveness on the part of the Respondent.”172
1. Obstruction as an Aggravating Factor or Sanctionable Practice 
The severity of the misconduct and the strength of evidence available 
to INT seem to play a role in INT’s decision whether to charge an Obstruc-
tive Practice or merely to allege interference as an aggravating factor.  Per-
haps the clearest comparison can be made between Sanctions Board Deci-
sions Nos. 60 and 61.  Both decisions addressed a respondent’s deletion of 
emails material to INT’s investigation, but the deletion in Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 60 was alleged to be an Obstructive Practice in itself, whereas 
the same act was characterized as an aggravating factor in Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 61.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, in addition to alleg-
ing that the respondents had engaged in corruption and fraud, INT alleged 
that the respondents engaged in obstruction when “[a] Respondent Director 
instructed [a] Respondent Project Manager to delete emails [relevant to the 
investigation].”173  A respondent commercial manager confirmed that 
emails had been deliberately deleted before INT’s arrival but argued that 
the deletion was a “panicked prior reaction which [Respondent] overcame 
and corrected, and which had no material . . . effect on the . . . investiga-
tion,” and that the conduct was “outweighed by the significant cooperation 
that the relevant Respondents provided to INT.”174  The Sanctions Board 
rejected these arguments, noting that regardless of any later regret, the 
emails were deleted with the intent to impede INT’s investigation, and any 
subsequent cooperation with the investigation could not serve to be excul-
patory but may only be considered as a mitigating factor.175
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, in addition to alleging that the 
respondent had engaged in fraud, INT argued that the respondent had de-
leted emails that implicated it in the fraud.176  The respondent argued that a 
 171.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, ¶ 37 (2014). 
 172.  Id.; see generally Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶¶ 31–33 (2015) (finding that 
there was insufficient evidence to conclude it was more likely than not that the respondents 
engaged in the alleged fraudulent practice).
 173.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 104 (2013). 
 174.  Id.
 175.  Id. at ¶ 105. 
 176.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, ¶ 38 (2013).   
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technical issue caused the unintentional loss of emails.177  Despite the ap-
parent lack of any credible explanation for the timing of the loss of emails 
shortly before INT’s fieldwork and the fact that the respondent was only 
able to recover one potentially exculpatory email, the Sanctions Board held 
that the record did not include sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
it was more likely than not that the respondents deliberately destroyed evi-
dence.178
In both Obstructive Practice and aggravating factor cases, Sanctions 
Board decisions suggest that the mens rea requirement is difficult to estab-
lish.  Again, the World Bank Procurement Guidelines define an Obstructive 
Practice as one done “in order to materially impede a Bank investigation” 
or as “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspec-
tion and audit rights.”179  The Sanctioning Guidelines’ aggravating factor 
definition (and the Anti-Corruption Guidelines) uses the same language, 
while also including “acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the 
Bank’s . . . access to information.”180
Therefore, INT must show that it is more likely than not that a re-
spondent engaged in the purported misconduct with the intent to materially 
impede a Bank investigation or the Bank’s contractual rights.  In Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 60, discussed above, the only Board decision to find 
that the required mens rea of Obstructive Practice was present, the re-
spondent admitted to deleting emails to impede the Bank’s investigation.181
Conversely, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 61, even considering the tim-
ing of the purported system failure and the firm’s ability to recover only 
one potentially exculpatory document, the Sanctions Board found insuffi-
cient evidence that the respondent intended to impede the Bank’s contrac-
tual rights or access to information. 
2. Roots of Obstructive Practices in Sarbanes-Oxley 
The precedent regarding Obstructive Practices is limited, and therefore 
it is also worth considering the history behind its adoption.  The Bank 
adopted Obstructive Practices as a new Sanctionable Practice in 2006 to 
reach certain acts not covered by the Bank’s then-existing prohibitions on 
fraud, corruption, collusion, and coercion.182  The Bank was concerned that 
 177.  Id.
 178.  Id.
 179.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines § 1.16(a)(v)(bb) (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014).  
 180.  World Bank Sanctioning Guidelines § IV(C)1 (Jan. 11, 2011); World Bank Anti-
Corruption Guidelines § 7(e) (Oct. 15, 2006, rev. Jan. 2011).
 181.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 104 (2013). 
 182.  See generally Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procure-
ment and Sanctioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006 (set-
2016] SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES AT THE WORLD BANK 1017 
“the destruction [of evidence] could only be used as an aggravating factor 
in the determination of sanctions, and only if the Bank were able to prove 
the underlying offense.”183  In other words, an entity could theoretically 
avoid sanctions altogether simply by sufficiently obstructing INT’s investi-
gation. 
According to a 2006 report, the Bank consulted the laws of several 
countries in devising its prohibition on Obstructive Practices.184  The Bank 
specifically highlighted Section 802 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519).185  Therefore, a firm plausibly 
could draw on precedents from the application of § 1519 in mounting a de-
fense to an Obstructive Practice charge. 
Among its extensive reshaping of U.S. securities regulation, SOX in-
troduced a new “anti-shredding” provision.  Crafted in broad terms, this 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, provides as follows: 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence 
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United 
States . . . or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or 
case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.186
Some commentators have described changes wrought by § 1519 as 
providing prosecutors with “greater power, lower requirements of proof, 
and increased penalties” as compared to previous obstruction-of-justice 
provisions.187  Presently, the text, legislative history,188 and judicial con-
ting forth new sanctionable practices).
 183.  Id. at 5.
 184.  Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanc-
tioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) July 28, 2006 at 14 n.24.  
 185.  Id.
 186.  Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanc-
tioning of Obstructive Practices (The World Bank, D.C.) Aug. 1, 2006.   
 187.  John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 
States, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 187, 194 (2005).
 188.  See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14–15 (2002) (§ 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to 
any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with the intent to 
obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter, and 
such matter is within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States”; is “specifically 
meant not to include any technical requirement . . . to tie the obstructive conduct to a pend-
ing or imminent proceeding or matter”; and intends to “do away with the distinctions . . . 
between court proceedings, investigations, regulatory or administrative proceedings (wheth-
er formal or not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their title”).  Contem-
poraneous statements from legislators support the expansive understanding of § 1519.  Upon 
introducing the bill, Representative John Conyers, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary 
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struction of § 1519 support a broad interpretation of the conduct prohibited 
by the statute.  Section 1519’s prohibition against “alter[ing], destroy[ing], 
mutilat[ing], conceal[ing], cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false 
entry in” any document or tangible object apparently is expansive enough 
to prohibit making false oral statements to company counsel conducting an 
internal investigation, whose findings will ultimately be conveyed to U.S. 
authorities.189
Speaking to the statute’s breadth, courts have interpreted § 1519 not to 
require a direct nexus between an obstructive act and an ongoing govern-
ment proceeding.  This has empowered the U.S. government to use the 
statute to prosecute obstructive conduct, for example, in the context of cor-
porate internal investigations even when there was no government proceed-
ing pending or even anticipated.190  Unlike the U.S. law interpreting § 1519, 
Committee and a sponsor of SOX, said that § 1519 would create a new “felony which could 
be effectively used in a wide array of cases where a person destroys or creates evidence with 
the specific intent to obstruct a federal agency or a criminal investigation.”  148 CONG. REC.
E463–01, E463 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2002) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).  Senator Pat-
rick Leahy—also a co-sponsor of the bill—declared on the Senate floor that “[t]here w[ill] 
be no technical requirement that a judicial proceeding was already underway or that the 
documents were formally under subpoena.”  148 CONG. REC. S1783–01, S1786 (daily ed. 
Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
 189.  In United States v. Ray, the U.S. government charged senior executives of a public 
company with conspiring to violate § 1519, by knowingly misleading the Chief Legal Of-
ficer in an internal investigation of potential stock-option backdating.  Criminal Information, 
United States v. Ray, No. 2:08-cr-01443 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008).  The Senior Vice Presi-
dent of Human Resources pleaded guilty to making false oral statements knowing that they 
would be incorporated into a report on the company’s stock-option grant process (which 
was submitted to the Audit Committee), “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a 
contemplated potential—but not actual or even imminent—SEC investigation of potential 
back-dating practices.  Plea Agreement for Defendant Gary Ray, United States v. Ray, No. 
2:08-cr-01443 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 190.  For example, in April 2009, Hong “Rose” Carson was indicted, along with several 
of her former co-workers at Control Components Inc. (“CCI”), a California-based control 
valve manufacturer, for conspiring to pay bribes in violation of the FCPA.  Carson was also 
charged with destroying documents relevant to CCI’s internal investigation of the payments, 
in violation of § 1519.  Prosecutors claimed that just before her interview with the private 
lawyers conducting the internal investigation, Carson tore up relevant documents and 
flushed them down the toilet in a restroom at CCI.  Although a federal investigation had not 
been initiated, CCI had made a voluntary disclosure to the government two days before Car-
son destroyed the documents. See Indictment at 10, 28-29, United States v. Carson, SACR 
No. 09-0077, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009) (demonstrating that CCI had made a voluntary dis-
closure); Richard L. Cassin, Rose Carson’s Big Flush, THE FCPA BLOG (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:28 
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/9/7/rose-carsons-big-flush.html 
[https://perma.cc/4C4C-RE4N].  A superseding information was filed on April 16, 2012, 
however, which eliminated the obstruction charge under § 1519.  Superseding Information, 
United States v. Carson, SACR No. 09-00077 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).  The government 
stated in its motion, without further explanation, that “[i]n the interests of justice, the gov-
ernment seeks an order dismissing count sixteen [charging Carson with a violation of § 
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however, the definition of Obstructive Practices does seem to require a 
nexus between obstructive conduct and a Bank inquiry.  Under the first 
prong of the definition, the act must be done “deliberately . . . in order to 
materially impede a Bank investigation”; and under the second prong of the 
definition, the act must be “intended to materially impede the exercise of 
the Bank’s inspection and audit rights.”191  Nevertheless, the logic behind 
U.S. court decisions could apply to the actions of employees who mislead 
internal investigators conducting a parallel inquiry into alleged Sanctiona-
ble Practices, knowing that the results of the investigation will be reported 
to INT.  Likewise, the definition of an Obstructive Practice seems to allow 
for the possibility of even going back in time and considering as “obstruc-
tive” false statements or destructive acts in a tender process taken to hide 
prohibited conduct from a future Bank inquiry. 
3. Threats, Harassment, and Intimidation 
Destroying, falsifying, and concealing documents are not the only 
types of obstructive behavior that are sanctionable:  “[T]hreatening, harass-
ing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of 
matters relevant to the investigation” also count.192  To date, only one Sanc-
tions Board decision has addressed such behavior, and it did so in the con-
text of considering it as an aggravating factor.  In Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 47, INT primarily alleged that the respondent had submitted eighteen 
forged or otherwise deceptive performance certificates to obtain Bank-
funded contracts.193  INT argued that the respondent interfered in the 
Bank’s investigation by “attempt[ing] to pressure the firms that purportedly 
had issued the certificates . . . into recanting their conclusions of fraud.”194
In considering whether the behavior warranted aggravation, the Sanc-
tions Board focused on the plain language of the Sanctioning Guidelines 
describing conduct constituting “interference by the sanctioned party in the 
1519] of the indictment.”  In United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008), a U.S. 
appeals court upheld the conviction under § 1519 of a police detective who made a false in-
cident report regarding the circumstances of an arrest, without knowing that the incident 
would later be investigated by the FBI.  The court found that it was sufficient for the pur-
poses of the statute that the defendant was aware that the FBI had jurisdiction to investigate 
claims. See also United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that it 
is sufficient that the “matter” in connection with which the obstruction occurred “is within 
the jurisdiction of a federal agency as a factual matter”). 
 191.  Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(v)(bb) (May 
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 192.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines § 1.16(a)(v)(aa) (Jan. 2011, rev. July 2014).   
 193.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 47 (Sanctions 
Case No. 121), ¶ 7 (2012). 
 194.  Id. at ¶ 46 (2012).
1020 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:4 
Bank’s investigation” as “threatening, harassing, or intimidating any party 
to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the inves-
tigation.” 195  The Sanctions Board concluded that INT offered no evidence 
that the respondent threatened, harassed, or intimidated anyone into recant-
ing past assertions of fraud.196  Merely asking a firm to retract its state-
ments, the Sanctions Board concluded, was insufficient to suggest a threat, 
harassment, or intimidation, as is required by the aggravating factor.197
Although the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence in this case, 
firms subject to the Bank’s Guidelines should be wary of inducing someone 
to withhold information from INT.  This portion of the Obstructive Practice 
definition is analogous to the U.S. criminal “witness and informant tamper-
ing” statute—18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)—and courts construing this statute his-
torically will consider any circumstance that suggests a request to withhold 
information was done in a subjectively or objectively threatening manner. 
Section 1512(b) provides as follows: 
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly 
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in mis-
leading conduct toward another person, with intent to— 
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person 
in an official proceeding; [or] 
(2) cause or induce any person to— 
(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, docu-
ment, or other object, from an official proceeding; [or] 
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with 
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for 
use in an official proceeding; 
. . . . 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.198
Judicial decisions interpreting § 1512(b) find that explicit threats of 
physical harm to prevent a party from providing evidence clearly satisfy the 
statute.199  But in the gray area between actual threats of physical force and, 
like in Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, mere requests not to disclose in-
 195.  Id. at ¶ 46 (2012).
 196.  Id. at ¶ 47.
 197.  Id.
 198.  18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). 
 199.  See United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a witness, 
who was the target of a murder investigation, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 when he met with 
the murder victim’s family and attempted to persuade them not to speak candidly in any 
government investigation, and implied victim’s family could be injured if they did not do as 
instructed).
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formation, § 1512(b) case law suggests that even mere requests can be 
threats if the requester knew that the recipient would feel threatened, given 
the requester’s status or past behavior.200  It would be logical for the Sanc-
tions Board to interpret an Obstructive Practice similarly.  Indeed, Sanc-
tions Board Decision No. 47 turned, in part, on the lack of any in-person 
meeting between the respondent and the representatives he was alleged to 
have threatened, and the lack of any other “evidence to suggest a threat, 
harassment or intimidation beyond the request itself.”201  Had there been 
evidence that the representatives actually felt threatened by the request, the 
Sanctions Board may well have concluded that such behavior qualified as 
an Obstructive Practice. 
4. Concerns Raised by Obstructive Practices 
Traditional requirements of due process are relaxed in administrative 
proceedings, like the World Bank’s sanctions regime.  Nevertheless, the 
World Bank has acknowledged that those accused of violating its rules are 
entitled to some measure of due process,202 and the sanctions regime as a 
whole reflects some due-process considerations.203  The creation of obstruc-
tion as a Sanctionable Practice in 2006, however, gave rise to new due pro-
cess concerns.  In particular, it has created a possible problem within the 
INT investigation process by shifting the balance of power in contractual 
interpretation decisively to INT.  The “contractual rights” referred to in the 
Obstructive Practice definition include contractual provisions in Bank-
funded contracts that typically allow the Bank to audit the “accounts and 
records relating to the performance of the [World Bank contract].”204  As 
discussed above, the scope of the Bank’s audit rights often is contested dur-
 200.  See United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a mere 
request to not talk to the police violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512 since a reasonable jury could infer 
that the defendant knew the employee would be threatened by such words, given his status 
as a police officer and her first-hand knowledge of his erratic personality and violent tem-
per).
 201.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 47 (2012).   
 202.  See Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Pro-
cess and Its Recent Reforms, A WORLD BANK STUDY (The World Bank, D.C.) 2012 at 2-3 
(“The Bank Group[‘s]  . . . quasi-judicial administrative process for sanctioning firms . . . is 
intended to provide the accused party . . . with an appropriate level of due process before it 
is decided whether the Respondent will be sanctioned and, if so, which sanction will be im-
posed.”).
 203.  See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Edouard Fromageau, Balancing the 
Scales: The World Bank Sanctions Process and Access to Remedies, 23 EUR. J. INT. LAW
963, 966 (2012) (discussing the due process considerations at play in the sanctions process).   
 204.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶ 103 (2014). 
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ing the course of an INT audit,205 and there is uncertainty about whether a 
respondent may attempt to hold INT to the strict confines of the Bank’s 
contractual audit rights without committing an Obstructive Practice.  With 
this lack of certainty and no apparent mechanism by which to seek a neutral 
decision, an entity facing a broad, potentially overreaching INT request 
may have two unattractive options:  (1) object to a request and face poten-
tial sanctions for obstruction or (2) comply with a request and risk poten-
tially damning information being discovered.  Importantly, such infor-
mation could be unrelated to a Bank project and still put a firm in legal 
jeopardy.  As a matter of policy, the Bank shares information with national 
authorities.206  Therefore, information could be discovered by INT during 
an over-broad inspection that will, in turn, be handed over to national au-
thorities that otherwise would lack probable cause.  This highly plausible 
scenario underscores the due process challenges this issue poses. 
Other than relying on INT to work through these issues in good faith, 
there currently is little opportunity for a party to object to a request or to 
seek an impartial determination of whether the Bank is entitled to certain 
information.  In the U.S. law enforcement context, information obtained 
where the government lacks probable cause might be excluded from evi-
dence.207  In contrast, “[f]ormal rules of evidence shall not apply” in Sanc-
tions Board proceedings.208  Rather, “[a]ny kind of evidence may form the 
basis of arguments presented in a sanctions proceeding and conclusions 
reached by the [SDO] or the Sanctions Board,” including hearsay evi-
dence—and, potentially, improperly obtained evidence—with the SDO and 
Sanctions Board having discretion “to determine the relevance, materiality, 
weight, and sufficiency of all evidence offered.”209  One potential solution 
would be for the SDO or Sanctions Board to accord no weight to improper-
ly obtained evidence, so as not to reward investigative overreach.  In a re-
lated situation, for example, Sanctions Board Decision Nos. 60 and 72 cau-
tion that “[t]he use of intimidation [by INT] is impermissible” and that 
“[a]ny suggestion that an interviewee’s request to consult a lawyer in itself 
demonstrates non-cooperation . . . may also raise concern as to the fairness 
of the investigation.”210  Another possible solution would be to enable a pu-
 205.  See The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 63 (2014) 
and Sanctions Board Decision No. 71 (2014) (detailing an instance of the Bank’s auditing 
rights being contested). 
 206.  See FY 15 Annual Update at 52-53 (providing information to national authorities). 
 207.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (providing for an exclusionary rule in evi-
dence).
 208.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, §7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012); accord The 
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, ¶ 8 (2013). 
 209.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, §7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012). 
 210.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 72, (Sanctions 
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tative respondent to contest the scope of an INT audit to the Sanctions 
Board while it is ongoing, somewhat like a motion to suppress evidence211
or even a Bivens action in U.S. federal courts.212
A further due process tension arises from the fact that the Bank does 
not require probable cause to exercise its audit right.  Unlike a prosecuting 
entity to whom the Bank very well could refer the investigation, INT can 
leverage the provisions common to Bank-funded contracts at will to con-
duct invasive investigations.  In addition, corporate deferred prosecution 
agreements resolving FCPA charges routinely require companies to “coop-
erate fully with . . . the Multilateral Development Banks (‘MDBs’), in any 
investigation of the Company.”213
B. Fraudulent Practice 
Nearly 75% of Sanctions Board decisions involve allegations of a 
Fraudulent Practice.214  Its definition and elements can vary depending up-
on which guidelines are incorporated in the bidding or procurement docu-
ments governing the project at issue.  The January 1997 Consultant Guide-
lines, for instance, define a Fraudulent Practice as a “misrepresentation of 
facts . . . in order to influence a selection process or the execution of a con-
tract . . . to the detriment of the Borrower.”215  The May 2004 Procurement 
Guidelines, by contrast, do not mention detriment to the borrower and de-
fine a Fraudulent Practice to include, in addition to misrepresentations, any 
“omission of facts in order to influence a procurement process or the execu-
tion of a contract.”216  The World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency has since 
opined that pre-2004 definitions of a Fraudulent Practice were never in-
tended to exclude omissions; rather, the 2004 definition clarified “existing 
understandings of the sanctionable practice, not expansions of their 
scope.”217
Case No. 211), ¶ 34 (2014) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 60 (2013)).
 211.  In U.S. federal courts and some state courts, criminal defendants can conditionally 
plead guilty while reserving the right to challenge the admissibility of certain inculpatory 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Goyer, 567 F. Appx. 414 (6th Cir. 2014) (providing an 
example of conditional pleadings). 
 212.  A Bivens action is initiated when a person sues federal officers for violating his or 
her constitutional rights. 
 213.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 5, United States v. Weatherford Int’l Ltd. (S.D. 
Tex. Nov. 26, 2013). 
 214.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 22. 
 215.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶ 29 (2012).
 216.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 46, ¶ 11 (2012).
 217.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
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In October 2006, the World Bank added an explicit mens rea require-
ment, defining a Fraudulent Practice as “any act or omission, including a 
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to 
mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obliga-
tion.”218  The Sanctions Board has read “knowingly or recklessly” into pre-
October 2006 definitions, concluding that the “October 2006 incorporation 
of the ‘knowing or reckless’ standard was intended only to make explicit 
the pre-existing standard for mens rea, not to articulate a new limitation.”219
The Bank again updated the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines in Ju-
ly 2014, but did not alter the definition of Fraudulent Practice. 220
The required objective or purpose of the misrepresentations or omis-
sions also can vary depending upon which definition applies.  The October 
2006 Procurement Guidelines require a misrepresentation or omission be 
made in order to “obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obliga-
tion,” whereas the May 2004 Procurement Guidelines look to whether a 
misrepresentation was intended to “influence” the selection or execution of 
a contract.221  The October 2006 definition appears to expand the range of 
conduct that could qualify as fraudulent, as the subject conduct is no longer 
tethered to that which is intended to influence the selection of execution of 
a contract.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, the respondent was subject 
to both definitions because of its involvement in one project in Ethiopia, 
which was governed by the May 2004 Procurement Guidelines, and two 
others in Tanzania and Uganda, both of which were governed by the Octo-
ber 2006 Procurement Guidelines.222  Combining the definitions, the Sanc-
tions Board noted that a Fraudulent Practice required INT to show “(i)[] 
misrepresentations or omissions of facts (ii) that were knowing or reckless 
(iii) in order to influence the procurement process or the execution of a 
contract (May 2004 Procurement Guidelines), or in order to obtain a finan-
cial or other benefit or avoid an obligation (October 2006 Procurement 
BANK, ¶ 124 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 218.  Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May 
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 219.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 14 (2015); Sanctions Board Decision No. 71, ¶ 
12 (2014). 
 220.  Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA 
Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (The World Bank, D.C.) Jan. 2011 rev. July 
2014; Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services Under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (The World Bank, D.C.) 
Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014. 
 221.  Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May 
2004); Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(ii) (May 
2004 rev. Oct. 1, 2006). 
 222.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 25 (2014). 
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Guidelines).”223  The Sanctions Board ultimately ruled in INT’s favor, con-
cluding that the misrepresentation related to the Ethiopia project “was in-
tended to ‘influence a procurement process’” and the misrepresentations 
related to the projects in Uganda and Tanzania “were made to ‘obtain a fi-
nancial or other benefit.’”224
1. Omission or Misrepresentation 
The Bank’s Guidelines do not define what constitutes a “misrepresen-
tation” or “omission.”  Typical misrepresentations considered in Sanctions 
Board decisions involve false bid information (e.g., fabricated performance 
certificates or forged signatures) or false documents used during contract 
execution (e.g., bogus invoices for reimbursement).225  In addition to af-
firmative misrepresentations, the Sanctions Board has also found that a re-
spondent’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest constituted a misrepre-
sentation or omission of facts.226
In determining whether a misrepresentation has occurred, the Sanc-
tions Board has relied on a variety of evidence.227  In several decisions, the 
Sanctions Board has found sufficient evidence of misrepresentations based 
primarily on admissions contained in responses to show-cause letters or at 
Sanctions Board hearings.228  The Sanctions Board also has considered 
statements from INT interviews to varying degrees.  Standardized state-
 223.  Id.
 224.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 74 ¶ 29 (2014). 
 225.  See World Bank Group, Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corrup-
tion and Poverty, SANCTIONS BOARD L. DIGEST, at 25-32 (Dec. 2011) (providing case sum-
maries).  Other examples of misrepresentation include forged advance payment guarantees, 
id. at 25; forged bid securities, id. at 25; falsified curriculum vitae, id. at 27; audit report of 
another entity in place of its own, id. at 28; forged financial report, id. at 28; forged manu-
facturer authorizations, id. at 30; and statements regarding the progress of contract execu-
tion, id. at 31.
 226.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 65 (2014).  The request for proposal at issue in 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 65 required bidders to disclose any existing conflicts of inter-
est.  The Sanctions Board relied on the definition of “conflict of interest” found in the May 
2004 Consultant Guidelines.  Because a conflict of interest existed and the Respondent did 
not disclose it, the Sanctions Board found that the Respondent’s proposal contained a mis-
representation or omission of facts. Id. ¶ 49; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 
50 (Sept. 30, 2015) (stating that failure to disclose an agency relationship as required consti-
tuted a misrepresentation).   
 227.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 46 ¶ 23 (2012) (representing one example); 
The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 ¶ 23 (2012).
 228.  See Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 ¶ 23 & n.7 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 2, ¶ 4 (2008) and Sanctions Board Decision No. 6, ¶ 6 (2009)); Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 21 (2012); Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶ 31 (2012); The 
World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶ 20 & n.8 (2014).   
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ments on pre-printed Bank letterhead have been found less compelling than 
personal attestations in the witness’s own words.229  Moreover, summaries 
prepared by INT, especially those which lack the interviewee’s signature or 
contain an alleged admission of misconduct, carry less weight than verba-
tim transcripts.230
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, one of only two publicly availa-
ble decisions in which the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence of a 
misrepresentation, the respondent submitted a bid to construct an underwa-
ter sewage outfall in Colombia.231  The bidding documents required each 
bidder to provide information about its experience as a principal contractor 
of similar projects.232  The respondent provided a list of previous projects 
and submitted a performance certificate purportedly signed by a representa-
tive involved in one of those projects.233  INT alleged that the certificate 
contained false statements and a false signature, pointing to a seemingly 
large amount of evidence, including facial inconsistencies on the certifi-
cate, the purported signatory’s denial of having signed the certificate, and 
other testimonial evidence that the respondent was not in fact the principal 
contractor for the listed project.234  Although the purported signatory’s de-
nial was transcribed by INT, the Sanctions Board noted several concerns 
that undermined its weight:  the purported signatory refused to provide a 
sample signature for comparison; would not reaffirm in a signed, written 
statement his testimony to INT; and refused to answer repeated questions 
regarding whether he would normally sign such documents.235
The Sanctions Board also considered whether there was evidence of 
misrepresentations on the face of the bid.  Here, too, the evidence was lack-
ing.236  Without appropriate comparators, the Sanctions Board rejected sup-
posed discrepancies in the certificate’s letterhead, font, and form.237  The 
Sanctions Board also rejected INT’s contention that the certificate falsely 
described the respondent as “the main contractor” for a listed project when, 
 229.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 24 (2012).   
 230.  Id.; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶¶ 33–34 (2014) (finding that the 
INT’s record of its interview with the Respondent should be given limited weight because 
the record was not created with adequate notice of the legal repercussions of the Respond-
ent’s statements).
 231.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 59 ¶¶ 5-7 (2013); The World Sanctions Board, Sanc-
tions Board Decision No. 73, (2014), discussed below, is the other publicly available deci-
sion in which the Sanctions Board found insufficient evidence of a misrepresentation as to 
one of the respondents.
 232.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 59, ¶ 6 (2013). 
 233.  Id. ¶ 7. 
 234.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 235.  Id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
 236.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 237.  Id. ¶ 24. 
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in fact, the certificate referred to the respondent’s role as “a Main Contrac-
tor.”238  In doing so, the Sanctions Board noted that INT relied on stale wit-
ness testimony characterizing the work the respondent actually performed 
as opposed to, for example, contemporaneous documents demonstrating the 
respondent’s actual role in the listed projects.239  The Sanctions Board 
therefore terminated the proceedings and lifted the temporary suspension 
that had been imposed by the SDO.240
The Sanctions Board has addressed the concept of a culpable act or 
omission consistently with its flexible approach to consider all forms of 
probative evidence.  Where testimony has been incomplete or incredible, 
the Sanctions Board has considered “whether the record as a whole may 
contain sufficient additional evidence to corroborate or complement the 
witness’s statements.”241  But as these decisions show, this does not mean 
that the Sanctions Board necessarily accepts any kind of evidence without 
scrutiny. 
2. Knowingly or Recklessly 
There often is little debate about whether, as a factual matter, a mis-
representation or omission occurred.  The more common focus is whether 
the misrepresentation or omission was done knowingly or recklessly.242
Nevertheless, the Sanctions Board has yet to find in a publicly available 
decision that a misrepresentation occurred without knowledge or reckless-
ness.  The Anti-Corruption Guidelines include an explanatory footnote 
providing that “[t]o act ‘knowingly or recklessly’, the fraudulent actor must 
either know that the information or impression being conveyed is false, or 
be recklessly indifferent as to whether it is true or false.”243  The Sanctions 
Procedures allow the Sanctions Board to infer knowledge from circumstan-
tial evidence.244  As the Legal Vice Presidency has explained, this flexible 
approach, consistent with the administrative nature of Sanctions Board pro-
 238.  Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 
 239.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 240.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 241.  Id. ¶ 24.
 242.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 51 (2015) (using the “knowingly” 
standard to find that the First Predecessor Firm failed to disclose its relationship with the 
Marketing Consultant); Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 23 (2012) (summarizing the 
parties’ arguments for and against the Respondent possessing the requisite knowledge and 
recklessness to establish a misrepresentation of facts).   
 243.  World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines, at 3 n.13 (Oct. 15, 2006 rev. Jan. 2011). 
 244.  World Bank Sanctions Procedures, art. VII, § 7.01 (Apr. 15, 2012) (noting that the 
“Evaluation Officer and the Sanctions Board shall have the discretion to infer purpose, in-
tent and/or knowledge on the part of the Respondent, or any other party, from circumstantial 
evidence”).
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ceedings, is designed to avoid unreasonable evidentiary burdens of proving 
scienter.245
Sanctions Board decisions frequently give brief attention to the issue 
of knowledge, as this concept is self-explanatory and may be substantiated 
through the respondent’s own contemporaneous statements or admissions 
made during sanctions proceedings.246  In “indirect fraud” cases, however, 
where the respondent relies on or conveys information supplied by a third 
party (for example, when a primary contractor submits a bid that contains 
false information from a subcontractor), establishing the mens rea required
for a Fraudulent Practice is more complex.  Here, the Sanctions Board has 
turned to the lesser standard of recklessness, which requires INT to show 
that the “respondent was aware of, but disregarded, a substantial risk – such 
as harm to the integrity of the Bank’s procurement process due to false or 
misleading bid documents.”247  Alternatively, if evidence fails to show sub-
jective awareness of a risk, the Sanctions Board looks to whether the re-
spondent “should have known of the substantial risk presented” by apply-
ing a “due care” standard—i.e., whether the respondent exercised “the 
degree of care the proverbial ‘reasonable person’ would exercise under the 
circumstances”—as informed by industry standards, customary or firm-
specific business policies, the World Bank’s procurement policies, and the 
underlying bidding documents.248  As discussed below, this approach veers 
from the commonly understood definition of recklessness under Anglo-
American jurisprudence and is more akin to simple negligence.249
 245.  Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶¶ 101, 104. 
 246.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 46, ¶ 24 (2012) (stating that the record in-
cluded an admission that the individual who forged a signature admitted that “he was not 
authorized” to sign the documents); Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 24 (2012) (holding 
that a deliberate attempt to mislead is sufficient to establish fraudulent practices and that a 
showing of actually being misled is unnecessary). See also Sanctions Board Decision No. 
83, ¶ 51 (2015) (finding that a failure to disclose an agency agreement was done knowing-
ly); Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶¶ 21–24 (Nov. 6, 2014) (finding that an inauthentic 
manufacturer’s authorization was submitted knowingly, based on inconsistent and incredible 
explanations); Sanctions Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 28 (2014) (relying on an admission to 
establish knowledge); Sanctions Board Decision No. 72, ¶ 40 (2014) (same).   
 247.  The World Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 51 (Sanctions Case No. 
145& 146), ¶ 33 (2012); Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 25 (2012); accord The World 
Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 82 (Sanctions Case No. 335), ¶ 31 
(2015) (stating that when circumstantial evidence indicates that one should have been aware 
of a substantial risk, the due care standard of a reasonable person applies).   
 248.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 82, supra note 247, ¶ 31; Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 51, ¶ 33 (2012).
 249.  See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007) (“While the 
term recklessness is not self-defining, the common law has generally understood it in the 
sphere of civil liability as conduct violating an objective standard: action entailing an unjus-
tifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” (inter-
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It also differs from the analysis of the Legal Vice Presidency.  In an 
advisory opinion from 2010, the Legal Vice Presidency clarified the stand-
ard for recklessness, among other legal issues.250  According to the Legal 
Vice Presidency, due care “asks what precautions a reasonable person 
would take — in the case of fraud, what steps a bidder should take to ascer-
tain the accuracy of information contained in the bid — in light of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that at least some of that information may be 
false or misleading.”251  The Legal Vice Presidency recommended that the 
degree of due care should correspond to the (1) likelihood that false infor-
mation is being conveyed and (2) potential severity of harm flowing there-
from.252  If either factor increases or decreases, so too does the standard of 
due care.253  The severity of harm, according to the Legal Vice Presidency, 
can be measured in terms of internal impact on the integrity of the pro-
curement process (i.e., to what extent is the information material to the 
overall bid), as well as collateral consequences (i.e., whether falsification 
potentially threatens life or severely impacts the economy).254  A 
cost/benefit analysis was also recommended:  “There may be cases where a 
particular risk is justifiable in light of the potential benefits to be 
gained . . . .”255  Likewise, “taking a particular risk may be justifiable in 
light of the exorbitant cost of guarding against it.”256
The standard of due care serves as a baseline against which to judge 
the respondent’s conduct.257  According to the Legal Vice Presidency, 
“recklessness requires a deviation [from due care] more egregious than ei-
ther simple and even ‘ordinary’ gross negligence.”258  In other words, “[i]t 
is not enough to show merely that the reasonable person would have acted 
differently in light of the risks involved, but [it must be shown] that the Re-
spondent’s conduct represents a shocking indifference to those risks.”259
Although the Legal Vice Presidency’s advisory opinion does not offer 
specific examples showing the degree of deviation from the common due 
care standard that would give rise to a Fraudulent Practice, it does provide 
that merely signing or including false or misleading information in bid ma-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  
 250.  Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 1. 
 251.  Id. ¶ 106. 
 252.  Id. ¶ 113. 
 253.  Id. ¶ 107. 
 254.  Id. ¶ 107. 
 255.  Id. ¶ 108. 
 256.  Id. ¶ 108. 
 257.  Id. ¶ 106. 
 258.  Id. ¶ 102. 
 259.  Id. ¶ 113. 
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terials would not, by itself, suffice.260  This is consistent with the Anti-
Corruption Guidelines, which state that inaccurate information caused by 
“simple negligence” does not constitute recklessness.261
To be clear, the Legal Vice Presidency offers its standard for due care 
only as a recommendation.  And it acknowledges that the standard ideally 
would be derived from the Bank’s procurement policies and the bidding 
documents governing the Bank-funded project.262  It also acknowledges, 
however, that the Bank’s policies do not provide a specific standard of care 
for preparing bids.263  Consequently, it recommends “alternative approach-
es to the development of a Bank-specific concept of an appropriate reason-
able standard of care in the context of Bank operations.”264
Its first alternative approach is to examine the bidding documents to 
see if they specify a standard of care.265  Its second alternative approach is 
to consider relevant industry standards and customary or firm-specific 
business policies, procedures, or practices.266  Finally, the Legal Vice Pres-
idency proposes that, when the first two approaches do not provide guid-
ance, “standards be articulated over time through jurisprudence.”267  The 
Legal Vice Presidency describes this third approach as “a kind of ‘common 
law’ approach to the development of Bank law in this area,”268 which re-
quires the SDO and Sanctions Board to “exercise discretion in deciding 
such cases based on the individual facts of each case.”269
Although the Bank has repeatedly stated that negligence is not enough 
to meet the mens rea required for a Fraudulent Practice, the Sanctions 
Board’s standard is similar to negligence—i.e., the failure to abide by the 
standards of a reasonable person under the same circumstances—rather 
than explicitly requiring the kind of “shocking” deviation from the standard 
of care suggested by the Legal Vice Presidency.  For example, in Sanctions 
 260.  Id. ¶ 115. 
 261.  World Bank Anti-Corruption Guidelines, supra note 243, at ¶ 7 n.10. 
 262.  Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 111. 
 263.  Id.
 264.  Id.
 265.  Id.
 266.  Id.
 267.  Id.
 268.  Id.  The Sanctions Board recognizes stare decisis; it routinely cites the precedents 
set by its prior decisions. See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 53 (2015) (“[T]he 
Sanctions Board will consider, consistent with past precedent, whether the First Predecessor 
Firm (i) had an actual or potential conflict of interest, (ii) that was subject to a disclosure 
obligation, and (iii) disclosed any such conflict of interest.”); Sanctions Board Decision No. 
81, ¶ 29 (2015) (Sanctions Board pronouncing that its interpretation of the May 2004 Con-
sultant Guidelines “would be consistent with the Sanctions Board’s precedent and the sanc-
tions framework”). 
 269.  Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 217, at ¶ 111. 
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Board Decision No. 82, INT alleged that the respondent, an accounting 
firm, recklessly appended inaccurate data sheets to audits report that it was 
selected to provide in connection with a Bank-funded project.270  The re-
spondent countered, among other things, that the information was prelimi-
nary and that local staff assigned to the audited project may have contribut-
ed to the alleged inaccuracies.271  The Sanctions Board determined that the 
respondent was on notice of a substantial risk of inaccuracies because of 
various difficulties in obtaining information, including the fact that some of 
the information could not have been verified until after the audit reports 
were submitted.272  The Sanctions Board applied a standard of care in-
formed by the terms of the relevant contracts.273  Because the information 
included on the data sheets appeared to be critical to the contracts, and be-
cause “the record d[id] not reflect that the Respondent took adequate steps 
to verify the statements and key findings” before submission, the Sanctions 
Board found that the respondent’s failure to confirm or correct the data 
sheets was reckless.274  Thus, although the facts presented may have actual-
ly suggested reckless conduct, the due care standard employed by the Sanc-
tions Board appeared more akin to negligence. 
Further, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 79, INT alleged that the re-
spondent acted knowingly or recklessly in submitting bids that contained a 
falsified work experience certificate.275  The respondent admitted that the 
certificate was falsified, but attributed the misconduct to a rogue employee 
project manager.276  The Sanctions Board concluded that the record did not 
support a finding that the respondent acted knowingly, but considered 
whether the respondent acted recklessly in submitting the false certifi-
cate.277  INT argued that the respondent must have been aware of the risk 
that the work experience certificate was false because it contained four 
“major discrepancies,” including identifying incorrectly the name, number, 
and value of the cited contract.278  In determining whether the respondent 
should have been aware of a substantial risk that the document was false, 
the Sanctions Board considered “whether any indicia of falsity were appar-
ent on the face of the document and whether a responsible individual made 
any effort to supervise the bid preparation process,” as well as “whether the 
record shows that the respondent took precautions that were commensurate 
 270.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 82 (Sanctions Case No. 335), ¶¶ 7, 8, 15 (2015).  
 271.  Id. ¶¶ 16, 21. 
 272.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 273.  Id. ¶ 33. 
 274.  Id. ¶¶ 33-34. 
 275.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 79, ¶ 6 (2015).
 276.  Id. at ¶ 12 (2015).
 277.  Id. at ¶¶ 24-25 (2015).
 278.  Id. at ¶ 25 (2015).
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with the risk involved.”279  The Sanctions Board determined that the re-
spondent’s employees should have been aware of a substantial risk that the 
certificate was false, because “basic discrepancies” on the document 
“should have been apparent . . . at the time of the Bids’ preparation.”280  In 
addition, the Sanctions Board faulted the employees who signed the bids 
for not examining the certificate for authenticity.281  Because of the reason-
able-person, due-care standard employed by the Board, it is difficult to 
gauge whether the respondent’s conduct actually constituted shocking in-
difference to a substantial risk rather than, for example, simple or even 
gross negligence.282
3. Analogues Under U.S. Law 
One established area of law in which the Sanctions Board can benefit 
from close examination as it further develops the Bank’s jurisprudence is 
the U.S. common law of fraud.  Such an approach may help to root the 
Sanctions Board’s jurisprudence more firmly in traditional concepts of 
recklessness, as suggested by the Legal Vice Presidency.  The common law 
elements of civil fraud in the United States can differ by state, but in most 
jurisdictions one of the elements is the “defendant’s knowledge that the 
statement was false.”283  Some states do not require direct knowledge but 
instead require a showing of recklessness. 
Those U.S. states that require recklessness, however, seem to interpret 
the standard as requiring further deviation from the standard of care than 
that employed by the Sanctions Board.  For example, both New York and 
Texas “permit a showing of scienter by recklessness only when the plaintiff 
alleges facts showing that the speaker made a statement as a definitive as-
sertion knowing he was without knowledge as to the truth.”284  In contrast, 
as discussed above, the Sanctions Board has found recklessness where the 
respondent “should have known” that a document “could be” forged.285
The Legal Vice Presidency’s 2010 advisory opinion explored U.S. 
laws for which “recklessness” and “knowledge” have been applied as an 
 279.  Id. at ¶ 27 (2015).
 280.  Id. at ¶ 28 (2015).
 281.  Id. at ¶¶ 28-29 (2015).
 282.  See also Sanctions Board Decision No. 77, ¶ 33 (2015) (applying the common “due 
care” standard).
 283.  Tricontinental Indus. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 
2007) (citing Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482 (Ill. 1996)).  
 284.  Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 761 
F. Supp. 2d 504, 536 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 285.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 52, ¶ 24 (2012). 
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element of fraud.286  In particular, the Legal Vice Presidency considered 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act, the books-and-records provi-
sion of the FCPA, and the False Claims Act.  Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act does not specify a mens rea, but courts have interpreted it to 
include a “knowing or reckless” standard.287  Courts construing Rule 10b-5 
have defined “reckless conduct” as “a highly unreasonable [act or] omis-
sion, involving . . . an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is ei-
ther known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been 
aware of it.”288  Likewise, under the books-and-records provision of the 
FCPA, issuers may be held criminally liable for knowingly falsifying 
books, records, or accounts.289  Similarly, the False Claims Act holds par-
ties liable for knowingly presenting a false claim for payment to the U.S. 
government, where “knowingly” includes “deliberate ignorance of the truth 
or falsity of the information” or “acts in reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the information.”290  As the Legal Vice Presidency noted in its 
2010 advisory opinion, U.S. courts have interpreted this language to in-
clude “failures to explore a credible concern about billing or other records, 
‘seriously deficient’ record-keeping systems or failures to inquire that rise 
to the level of ‘deliberate ignorance.’”291  Reference to these developed are-
as of law that address the concept of recklessness could aid the Sanctions 
Board in sharpening its jurisprudence. 
 286.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 99 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 287.  Id. at ¶ 99 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976)). 
 288.  Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis 
added); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (em-
phasis added and internal citation omitted). 
 289.  United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009).  The Legal Vice Pres-
idency’s advisory opinion does not appear to have considered civil liability under the 
FCPA’s books-and-records provision, which requires issuers to keep books and records with 
“such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the con-
duct of their own affairs.”  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).  The U.S. Congress legislated that an or-
ganization must act with specific intent to be held criminally liable.  Most courts have con-
strued the accounting provisions to have no scienter requirement when enforced civilly 
against issuers.  F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, at A-23, 285 SECURITIES
PRACTICE PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) (2014). 
 290.  31 U.S.C § 3729 (b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii).  
 291.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 99 (Nov. 15, 2010). (citing Miller v. United States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1997) 
and United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
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4. To Obtain a Financial or Other Benefit or Avoid an Obligation 
The January 2011 Procurement Guidelines (as revised in July 2014) 
require the misrepresentation to be motivated by financial gain, some other 
benefit, or avoidance of an obligation.292  Under the earlier definitions of a 
Fraudulent Practice, INT need only show that the misrepresentation oc-
curred in order to influence the procurement process or execution of a con-
tract.293  Whichever standard applies, the threshold to establish this element 
is quite low.  If the Sanctions Board concludes it is more likely than not 
that a knowing or reckless misrepresentation occurred, the act of submitting 
the falsification—whether for a tender or during contract execution—
generally suffices to establish a motive either to obtain a financial gain or 
to influence the procurement process or execution of a contract.  As the 
Sanctions Board stated in Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, the Board has 
“found sufficient evidence of intent to influence the procurement process 
where the record showed that misrepresentations had been made in re-
sponse to a tender requirement” and has found “evidence of intent to influ-
ence the execution of a contract where a misrepresentation was material to 
a respondent’s remuneration.”294  For example, the Sanctions Board has 
found that the submission of a forged certificate was aimed to influence the 
procurement process because the tender required such a certificate and the 
respondent likely submitted the forged certificate to win the bid.295  Simi-
larly, in a case where a general manager signed and submitted a letter of 
commitment under a consultant’s name without permission, the Sanctions 
Board inferred motive to influence the bidding process because the request 
for proposal required the certificate and because the tendering entity “made 
clear in negotiations it saw the Consultant’s particular involvement as im-
 292.  Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.16(a)(ii) (Jan. 2011 
rev. July 2014).
 293.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 101 (2013) (finding all elements of 
fraud because it was more likely than not misrepresentation occurred to influence the pro-
curement process and/or to obtain a financial benefit); Sanctions Board Decision No. 53, ¶ 
35 (2012) (finding misrepresentations in the invoices and supporting documentation were 
made in order to influence the execution of a contract).  
 294.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶¶ 52, 63 & nn.10, 13 (2015) (citing Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 74, ¶ 29 (2014) and Sanctions Board Decision No. 56, ¶ 47 (2013)).
 295.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 54, ¶ 28 (2012); 
see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 75, ¶ 25 (2014) (“The Sanctions Board has previous-
ly found that, where the record showed that a respondent’s submission of forged or mislead-
ing documents was made in response to a bid requirement, the respondent’s use of the doc-
uments was more likely than not intended to show the respondent’s qualifications and 
thereby help the respondent win the tender and benefit from such award.”).
2016] SANCTIONABLE PRACTICES AT THE WORLD BANK 1035 
portant.”296  In contrast, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, the Sanctions 
Board concluded, over a dissent, that meeting minutes that incorrectly rep-
resented a proposed team leader’s availability for the contract at issue were 
not intended to influence the selection process in light of evidence that the 
respondent had previously communicated the team leader’s unavailability 
to the implementing agency.297
With respect to motive of financial gain, which was first set forth in 
the 2006 Procurement Guidelines, trying to obtain a contract appears to be 
considered synonymous with seeking to obtain a financial benefit.298  In 
fact, the Sanctions Board has rejected arguments that the respondent did 
not need to win a tender and therefore was not motivated by financial gain, 
observing that “[e]ven if Respondent had other business priorities, it must 
have stood to obtain some benefit from being awarded the Tender; other-
wise it would not have authorized the bid in the first place.”299  Notably, 
nowhere in the publicly available Sanctions Board misrepresentation deci-
sions has the Sanctions Board ever concluded that motive of financial gain 
did not exist where there was an attempt to influence the procurement pro-
cess or contract execution.  For all practical purposes, a knowing or reck-
less submission of a misrepresentation in the course of a Bank-funded pro-
ject appears to satisfy this element. 
5. Detriment to the Borrower 
Some definitions of a Fraudulent Practice require detriment to the bor-
rower.  The Sanctions Board defines “detriment to the Borrower” broadly 
to include “not only tangible or quantifiable harms, but also intangible 
harms.”300  Again, the threshold here is quite low.  “Detriment to the bor-
rower” generally is established so long as the misrepresentation could con-
ceivably harm the borrower, even if the respondent ultimately completed 
the contract as specified.  This is because the Sanctions Board regards a 
fraudulent submission as inherently detrimental; misrepresentations distort 
the selection process, undermine a fair and efficient procurement process, 
and waste the borrower’s time and resources on reviewing invalid bids.301
 296.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 51, ¶ 40 (2012).   
 297.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 81, ¶ 43 (2015).   
 298.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 101 (2013) (listing a contract award 
as an example of a financial benefit); Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 26 (2012) (finding 
the respondent had submitted fraudulent documents to be awarded the tender and obtain 
some financial benefit as a result).   
 299.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 26 (2012).   
 300.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 29 (2012).   
 301.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 41 (2010)); see also Sanctions Board De-
cision No. 73, ¶ 34 (2014) (“Detriment to a borrowing country may include intangible as 
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In cases where the misrepresentation led to obtaining a Bank-financed con-
tract, inherent harm results simply by contracting with “a bidder willing to 
engage in unethical behavior.”302  No publicly available Sanctions Board 
decision has found that a knowing or reckless misrepresentation failed to 
cause (even intangible) harm to the borrower.  Again, it appears from the 
decisions issued to date that knowing or reckless misrepresentations are 
considered to be inherently prejudicial.  Perhaps because it was rendered 
redundant, this element was removed from the Guidelines in 2004 and has 
not reappeared in subsequent versions. 
6. Respondeat Superior 
The Sanctions Board sometimes must determine whether an employer 
is liable for the fraudulent acts of its employees under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior.  In these instances, the Sanctions Board considers 
“whether the employees acted within the course and scope of their em-
ployment, and were motivated, at least in part, by the intent of serving their 
employer.”303  Where a respondent company argues that the misconduct 
was the result of a “rogue employee,” the Sanctions Board will assess “evi-
dence presented regarding the scope and adequacy of the respondent enti-
ty’s controls and supervision at the time of the misconduct.”304  The Sanc-
tions Board has declined to require proof that an entity expressly condoned 
or directed the misconduct in question, and has instead asked “whether the 
employee’s misrepresentations were . . . ‘a mode, albeit an improper mode’ 
of carrying out his duties.”305
For example, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, the deputy general 
manager of the respondent’s branch office forged a bid document.306  As a 
defense, the respondent argued that the deputy general manager engaged in 
the misconduct without its consent, authorization, or knowledge.307  The 
Sanctions Board, however, did not endorse this “rogue employee” theory, 
well as tangible or quantifiable harms . . . .”); Sanctions Board Decision No. 69, ¶ 24 (2014) 
(same).  
 302.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 47, ¶ 29 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 41 (2010)).
 303.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 69 (2015); Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, ¶ 
35 (2014). 
 304.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 83, ¶ 69 (2015); see also Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 48, ¶ 28 (2012) (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 37, ¶ 42 (2010)) (finding an em-
ployer’s failure to implement any controls enough to hold it responsible for the actions of its 
employees and finding no evidence of any defenses such as a “rogue employee”).  
 305.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 48, ¶ 29 (2012).  
 306.  Id. at ¶ 8 (2012). 
 307.  Id. at ¶ 16(ii) (2012).
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holding the respondent liable because it did not have controls in place to 
prevent or detect the type of misconduct that occurred, nor did it adequately 
supervise the employee,308 despite what the Sanctions Board viewed as his 
“relative inexperience and the challenges of the operating environment in 
which Respondent placed him.”309  Responsibility for preparing the bidding 
documents was left entirely to the branch office, which had no arrange-
ments to verify their accuracy.310  Additionally, the Sanctions Board viewed 
as probative the respondent’s incentive structure, in which employees re-
ceived bonuses based on the contracts they brought in.311  The Sanctions 
Board found that the incentive structure was not necessarily inappropriate, 
“but [that] it demands strong controls to ensure unethical conduct does not 
result.”312
In contrast, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, the Sanctions Board 
found that the respondent firm was not responsible for the respondent di-
rector’s fraudulent conduct.  In particular, the evidence failed to show that 
the director was acting on behalf of the firm as a duly authorized officer 
and employee.313
In sum, though the definition of a Fraudulent Practice varies some-
what depending on which Guidelines apply, it generally requires a re-
spondent knowingly or recklessly mislead, or attempt to mislead, a party 
for the purpose of obtaining a benefit or avoiding an obligation.  A Fraudu-
lent Practice is the most common charge brought before the Sanctions 
Board and can be proven in a variety of ways.  In most Fraudulent Practice 
cases, proving knowledge or recklessness has been relatively straightfor-
ward.  For “indirect fraud” cases where information is conveyed by third 
parties, the Sanctions Board considers recklessness using a “due care” 
standard akin to negligence.  Similar to showing fraud under U.S. civil law, 
the Legal Vice Presidency has recommended that recklessness require more 
than a simple deviation from the standard of due care.  But in practice, the 
Sanctions Board has applied a standard that hews more closely to negli-
gence.  Finally, the Sanctions Board has applied basic principles of re-
spondeat superior to determine whether an employer is liable for the fraud-
ulent acts of its employees. 
 308.  Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
 309.  Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
 310.  Id. at ¶ 30 (2012).
 311.  Id. at ¶ 31 (2012).
 312.  Id. at ¶ 31 (2012).
 313.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 73, ¶ 36 (2014).  
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C. Corrupt Practice 
Corruption in connection with a Bank-financed project can also lead 
to sanctions.  Earlier World Bank Guidelines defined a Corrupt Practice as 
“the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of anything of value to influ-
ence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection] process 
or in contract execution.”314  That definition survived several revisions be-
fore being subtly expanded in May 2004 to encompass “the offering, giv-
ing, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to 
influence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection] 
process or in contract execution.”315
Another change resulted from October 2006 amendments that rede-
fined a Corrupt Practice as “the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, di-
rectly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions 
of another party.”316  The Guidelines have undergone several subsequent 
revisions—the Procurement Guidelines most recently in July 2014—but 
this definition remains operative.317  Two footnotes in the Guidelines eluci-
date the added text.  The first states that “any action to influence the [pro-
curement or selection] process or contract execution for undue advantage is 
improper.”318  And the second defines “another party” as “a public official 
acting in relation to the [procurement or selection] process or contract exe-
cution.”319  This clarification seemingly cuts against the interpretation that 
“another party” was substituted for “public official” in October 2006 to 
give the definition a broader scope. 
Typical corruption cases reviewed by the Sanctions Board involve al-
legations of payments to procurement officials in exchange for confidential 
 314.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52.  This definition 
applied to any cases brought under the January 1995 version of the Procurement Guidelines
(rev. Jan. and Aug. 1996, Sept. 1997, and Jan. 1999) or the January 1997 version of the 
Consultant Guidelines (rev. Sept. 1997, Jan. 1999, and May 2002).  Id.
 315.  Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(i) (May 
2004) (emphasis added); Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World 
Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.22(a)(i) (May 2004) (emphasis added).  This definition applies to cases 
brought under the May 2004 versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines.  Up-
holding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, SANCTIONS BOARD
LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52. 
 316.  Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits ¶ 1.14(a)(i) (May 
2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added); Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consult-
ants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.22(a)(i) (May 2004 rev. Oct. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 317.  Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers ¶ 1.16(a)(i) (Jan. 2011 
rev. July 2014).
 318.  Id. at ¶ 1.16 n.19 (emphasis added). 
 319.  Id. at ¶ 1.16 n.20.
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information (e.g., technical specifications) during the tender process.320  In 
other cases, a government official may have awarded a Bank-financed con-
tract to an entity in exchange for a kickback.321
The elements of a Corrupt Practice vary somewhat depending on 
which definition applies.  Distilling the elements, a Corrupt Practice in-
volves offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, any-
thing of value to improperly influence the actions of a public official in re-
lation to the procurement process or contract execution.322
The written elements of the Corrupt Practice definition strongly re-
semble those of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, which make it illegal 
to corruptly offer or provide money or anything of value to officials of for-
eign governments, foreign political parties, or public international organi-
zations with the intent to obtain or retain business.323  Those familiar with 
the FCPA, however, should not automatically equate this standard with a 
Corrupt Practice.  As described below, though there are commonalities be-
tween the two, the FCPA has not always been interpreted or applied in the 
same manner as a Corrupt Practice. 
1. Offering or Giving a Thing of Value 
Liability for a Corrupt Practice requires that the respondent gives or 
offers, either directly or indirectly, anything of value.324  Bank Guidelines 
and Sanctions Board decisions have not defined the term “anything of val-
ue.”  Available Sanctions Board decisions regarding a Corrupt Practice 
generally involve the transfer of money, but Bank Guidelines and Sanctions 
Board decisions have never suggested that the term “anything of value” is 
limited to money.  Indeed, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, the Sanc-
tions Board determined that employing a project manager’s daughter quali-
fied as a thing of value for the project manager.325  In Sanctions Board De-
cision No. 66, the Sanctions Board similarly concluded that hiring a World 
 320.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 84 (2013) (showing an example of a 
firm that allegedly attempted to influence a Procurement Advisor). 
 321.  See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 29 (2012) (stating that two consorti-
um partners agreed to a bribe via a management fee in a contract). 
 322.  Cf. Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 20 (2014) (“In accordance with the defini-
tion of a corrupt practice under Paragraph 1.14(a)(i) of the October 2006 Procurement 
Guidelines, INT bears the initial burden to show that it is more likely than not that Respond-
ents (i) offered or gave, directly or indirectly, anything of value (ii) to influence improperly 
the actions of another party.”).
 323.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2016). 
 324.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 65 (2013). 
 325.  The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶¶ 53–54 
(2015).
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Bank staff member’s son satisfied this element.326
The same term in the FCPA is not defined in the statute or legislative 
history, but it is commonly understood to include items such as gifts, travel, 
entertainment, jobs and internships, favors, meals, educational and medical 
expenses, and travel assistance.327  And there is no statutory exception for 
nominal payments or gifts.328  This element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions seems consistent with the Bank’s definition of a Corrupt Prac-
tice.  Consummated and attempted bribes are proscribed in each domain, as 
are nontraditional bribes, such as offers of jobs and internships.  Both re-
gimes also lack any explicit exception for nominal payments. 
The Sanctions Board considers the terms “give” and “offer” as alter-
native elements of a Corrupt Practice.329  The term “offer” refers to “both a 
proactive offer of payment and a promise or commitment to pay a bribe 
when solicited.”330  Thus, even if no payment occurs, the mere offer of a 
bribe can qualify as a Corrupt Practice.331  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 
60, for example, a consultancy agreement required the respondent to pay 
five percent of the total contract value to a Bank-employed procurement 
advisor.332  The consultancy agreement contemplated a five-percent fee for 
other, future contracts.333  The Sanctions Board acknowledged that the rec-
ord showed no evidence of an actual payment in connection with the other 
contracts.334  But based on the consultancy agreement, and coupled with 
other corroborating evidence,335 the Sanctions Board concluded that the re-
spondent’s promise of future payments to the procurement advisor was an 
offer for purposes of a Corrupt Practice.336
 326.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 66, ¶ 24 (2014). 
 327.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act 14-15 (2012). 
 328.  F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S. For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance, 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) A-16 (2014).
 329.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 70 (2013); Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶ 
54 (2015). 
 330.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 73 (2013). 
 331.  Id. at ¶ 70; see also Sanctions Board Decision No. 63, ¶ 59 (2014) (“[T]he first el-
ement of the definition of corrupt practices requires only that the Respondents have offered 
or given something of value – not that all the earmarked funds were ultimately disbursed.”). 
 332.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 71 (2013). 
 333.  Id.
 334.  Id. at ¶ 72. 
 335.  In particular, the Sanctions Board noted that respondent provided a listing of all 
contracts in which the Procurement Advisor was involved and the type of services provided.  
Id.  Further, INT interviews and email correspondence revealed communications between 
the respondent and the procurement advisor regarding tenders before the public issuance of 
the bidding documents and during the procurement processes. Id.
 336.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 74 (2013). 
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The Sanctions Board has found that even silence, although not explic-
itly contemplated in the Bank Guidelines defining a Corrupt Practice, can 
constitute an offer of a bribe.  Acquiescence by silence occurs when “the 
silent party heard and understood what was being said” and “the silence in 
response to what was being said was, under the circumstances, so unnatural 
as to amount to implied acquiescence.”337  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 
50, the Sanctions Board concluded that “persistent silence – in the face of 
repeated attempts to make unexplained reallocations that happen to corre-
spond to the amount of the alleged improper payment at issue – is more 
likely than not a sign Respondent had agreed to the payment scheme.”338
The respondent and several business partners attended a meeting at which 
an agreement was reached to improperly pay an agency seventeen percent 
of a contract’s value as a “management fee.”339  INT acknowledged that the 
respondent’s director was silent during the meeting, but contended that his 
silence signaled acquiescence to offering a bribe.340  The Sanctions Board 
was not persuaded that the meeting alone constituted such an offer, but it 
considered additional evidence, including a subsequent meeting at which 
the respondent commented that the partners should honor their commit-
ments or risk harm.341  Perhaps most influential to the Sanctions Board’s 
decision was a series of email exchanges over the course of two months be-
tween the partners concerning a dispute over the allocation of funds.342  The 
respondent was copied on the emails but remained silent throughout.343
The Sanctions Board also has recognized that although the Guidelines 
do “not explicitly provide for liability on the basis of support, authoriza-
tion, and oversight of corrupt acts[;] a respondent cannot avoid liability 
simply by directing or empowering another party to make corrupt pay-
ments.”344  Thus, like the FCPA, liability for corrupt practices can extend to 
situations involving “instructions or orders, approval or guidance, or in-
ferred authorization in cases of close supervision,” or “a duty to supervise 
combined with deliberate non-intervention.”345  In Sanctions Board Deci-
sion No. 64, the Sanctions Board squarely considered this issue.  In that de-
cision, the Sanctions Board determined that the respondent was not culpa-
ble for a bribery scheme where there was no evidence that he instructed or 
 337.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 30 (2012) (citing J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-202 n.15 (1985)).
 338.  Id. at ¶ 37 (2012). 
 339.  Id. at ¶ 29. 
 340.  Id.
 341.  Id. at ¶ 41. 
 342.  Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. 
 343.  Id. at ¶ 37. 
 344.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 64, ¶ 37 (2014). 
 345.  Id.
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ordered the payment of bribes, played any role in discussions to initiate the 
scheme, or approved or guided the alleged misconduct.346  The Sanctions 
Board also found insufficient evidence that the respondent had a duty to 
supervise the employee who allegedly paid the bribes, knew of or was will-
fully blind to the employee’s misconduct, and did not intervene.347
2. Solicitation 
Bank Guidelines and Sanctions Board decisions do not define “solicit-
ing.”  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, discussed above, is one of the only 
publicly available decisions to consider this term.  There, the question was 
whether a managing director’s comment to consortium partners regarding 
the necessity of honoring commitments—which INT contended was an ef-
fort to pressure the partners to participate in the bribery scheme—
constituted solicitation, albeit on behalf of someone else.348  The Sanctions 
Board answered in the affirmative, noting that “[n]othing in the applicable 
definition specifies that one must solicit payment for oneself, or that the so-
liciting party must be the party with influence.”349  The Sanctions Board 
concluded that solicitation includes “both the act of soliciting something 
for oneself in exchange for exerting improper influence, as well as the act 
of soliciting or enticing another to give something to a third party in ex-
change for the third party’s improper influence.”350  Hence, the term “solic-
iting” encompasses asking for and accepting a bribe, as well as asking or 
enticing another to commit bribery.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, 
sufficient evidence of solicitation was present where a project manager 
emailed companies requesting that they consider hiring her daughter.351
3. Public Official / Another Party 
As discussed above, for contracts governed by earlier definitions of a 
Corrupt Practice, the respondent must act with a purpose to “influence the 
action of a public official in the [procurement] process or in contract execu-
tion.”352  Later versions of the Guidelines require a motivation to influence 
“another party.”353  As noted above, however, a footnote in the Guidelines 
 346.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
 347.  Id. at ¶ 39. 
 348.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, ¶ 42 (2012). 
 349.  Id. at ¶ 44. 
 350.  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). 
 351.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶ 63 (2015). 
 352.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty, 2011 
WORLD BANK GROUP SANCTIONS BD. LAW DIGEST, ch. D, §2(a), at 52. 
 353.  Id. at 53. 
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defines “another party” as “a public official acting in relation to the [pro-
curement or selection] process or contract execution.”354  The Guidelines 
also state that “[i]n this context, ‘public official’ includes World Bank staff 
and employees of other organizations taking or reviewing procurement de-
cisions.”355  The Sanctions Board likewise has held that the terms “public 
official” and “another party” refer to “public officials acting in relation to 
the procurement process or contract execution, including ‘World Bank staff 
and employees of other organizations taking or reviewing procurement de-
cisions.’”356  It is not synonymous with the term “government official.”357
The only publicly available Sanctions Board decision analyzing this 
element concluded that a short-term consultant for the Bank qualified as a 
“public official,” even though the consultant never held a World Bank staff 
position or formal appointment related to the contracts at issue.358  The 
Sanctions Board noted that “[e]ven without being officially assigned re-
sponsibility in a procurement process, a public official may have an actual 
or perceived role in taking or reviewing procurement decisions, and thus be 
the target of sanctionable influence.”359  Although formal designations are 
unnecessary, qualifying as a “public official” does require some position of 
influence over the contract at issue.360  The Sanctions Board found that the 
short-term consultant’s involvement in the procurement process for the 
contracts at issue, coupled with his employment as a consultant for the 
World Bank during the years in which the alleged misconduct occurred, 
qualified him to meet the definition of a “public official.”361
The “foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provi-
sions—as interpreted—is clearly broader than its World Bank analogue.  
U.S. courts have addressed the scope of the FCPA’s definition when issu-
ing jury instructions in FCPA trials.  The FCPA defines a “foreign official” 
 354.  Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants ¶ 1.16 n.20 (Jan. 2011 rev. July 2014); see also 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 22 (2014) (discussing this explanatory note). 
 355.  See Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants, supra note 34 (emphasis omitted); see also Sanc-
tions Board Decision No. 66, ¶ 25 (2014) (stating that a World Bank staff member qualifies 
as a public official). 
 356.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 75 (2013) (citing the May 2004 Procurement 
Guidelines, § 1.14(a)(i) n.17, and October 2006 Procurement Guidelines, § 1.14(a)(i) n.19). 
 357.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 78, ¶ 45 (2015). 
 358.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 77 (2013). 
 359.  Id. at ¶ 78. 
 360.  See, e.g., id. at  ¶ 77-78 (stating that without official responsibility for procurement, 
a public official may still have a real or perceived role in the procurement decision-making 
process, which can open the official to outside influence); Sanctions Board Decision No. 50, 
¶ 45 (2012).
 361.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 78 (2013). 
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as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, 
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or  . . . public inter-
national organization.”362  Employees of all ranks fall within the scope of 
this provision.363  Precisely what constitutes a foreign government “agency” 
or “instrumentality,” however, has been the subject of litigation, owing to 
the government’s broad interpretation of those terms.364  A “public interna-
tional organization” is any organization designated as such by executive 
order and includes organizations such as the World Bank, the United Na-
tions, the International Monetary Fund, and the Red Cross.365  Employees 
of such organizations qualify as foreign officials under the FCPA.366
Finally, it bears mentioning that the mental state necessary to satisfy 
the “public official” element of a Corrupt Practice is unclear.  The few rel-
evant Sanctions Board publicly available decisions generally focus on 
whether the recipient was, in fact, a public official.  But the Sanctions 
Board has never specifically considered—and World Bank Guidelines do 
not provide—whether the respondent must know it was bribing a public of-
ficial.  In one FCPA enforcement case, in contrast, Judge James V. Selna of 
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued instruc-
tions that specifically required the jury to determine whether the bribe was 
to “a person the defendant knew or believed to be a foreign official.”367  But 
some mental culpability clearly is required to commit a Corrupt Practice 
because the Sanctions Board has stated that the respondent must have “act-
ed with a purpose to (i) ‘influence the action of a public official[‘] . . . or 
(ii) ‘influence improperly the actions of another party.’”368  Although pur-
poseful influence is required, it is less clear if this means a respondent must 
have known or believed that the recipient was a public official.  From the 
limited precedent available, the answer appears to be that a respondent 
must understand, at some level, it is attempting to bribe a public official.  In 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, the Sanctions Board concluded that the 
respondent committed a Corrupt Practice because he “approved a payment 
 362.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2016). 
 363.  See F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant & Elizabeth Goergen Silver, The U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Enforcement and Compliance 285 SECURITIES PRACTICE
PORTFOLIO SERIES (BNA) at A-13 (2014) (broadly subjecting all ranks of employees to this 
“foreign official” element of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision).   
 364.  Id.
 365.  Id. at A-14.
 366.  Id.
 367.  Order Regarding Select Jury Instructions at 11, United States v. Carson, SACR 09-
00077 JVS (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2012). 
 368.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 75 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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that he knew was intended to influence a public official.”369  Moreover, the 
Sanctions Board indirectly suggested that unawareness of the recipient’s 
status as a public official would have constituted a valid defense to a Cor-
rupt Practice when it rejected the respondent’s contention that they “were 
not aware of the Procurement Advisor’s official status, since he had intro-
duced himself as an independent expert in his communications with 
them.”370  Nevertheless, in the same decision, the Sanctions Board noted 
that INT need not prove that the respondent “knew the identity of the spe-
cific beneficiary of [the] payment.”371
4. To Influence (Improperly) the Action of a Public Official 
This element varies to some degree depending on which definition of 
a Corrupt Practice applies.  Earlier Bank Guidelines require a motive “to 
influence the action of a public official in the [procurement or selection] 
process or in contract execution.”372  The current definition requires a mo-
tivation to “influence improperly the actions of another party,”373 presuma-
bly obviating arguments that a certain bribe somehow skirted both the pro-
curement process and the contract’s execution.  Although Bank Guidelines 
do not define improper influence, the Sanctions Board has taken an expan-
sive approach.  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, the Sanctions Board 
found that payments to a procurement advisor “to do his job properly” and 
to avoid unfair treatment constituted improper influence.374  The Sanctions 
Board held that the term “improper influence is not limited to circumstanc-
es in which a public official is induced to act in breach of his or her duties 
(e.g., by promoting an unqualified bidder for contract award).”375  Rather, 
the Sanctions Board concluded that it also encompasses payments made in 
order to cause “a public official to act or refrain from acting in connection 
with his or her official duties . . . regardless of whether the official’s act 
 369.  Id. at 81 (emphasis added).  
 370.  Id. at 83. 
 371.  Id. at ¶ 81. 
 372.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 52.  This definition 
applied to any cases brought under either the January 1995 version of the Procurement 
Guidelines, which was revised in January and August 1996, September 1997, and January 
1999, or the January 1997 version of the Consultant Guidelines, which was revised in Sep-
tember 1997, January 1999, and May 2002.  Id.
 373.  Id. at 53 (emphasis added). This definition applies to cases brought under the Octo-
ber 2006, May 2010, or January 2011 versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines, 
or under the October 2006 or January 2011 version of the Anticorruption Guidelines. Id.
 374.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, ¶ 80 (2013). 
 375.  Id. at ¶ 82 (internal quotations omitted). 
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would have been lawful had the payment or offer not been made.”376  This 
view accords with the Legal Vice Presidency’s 2010 advisory opinion, 
which opined that the giving of a bribe is inherently improper, “whether or 
not the person accepting the bribe takes any improper action, or even 
whether or not the bribe is intended to induce an improper action . . . .”377
In light of the Sanctions Board’s expansive interpretation of the term 
“improper,” it seems there is no carve-out for the kind of “facilitating pay-
ments” contemplated by the FCPA.  Under the FCPA’s facilitating pay-
ments exception, payments may be made to secure the performance of non-
discretionary, “routine government action,” such as processing visas, ob-
taining work permits, or similar clerical acts.378  Though Sanctions Board 
decisions have not explicitly ruled out facilitating payments, its imposition 
of liability in Sanctions Board Decision No. 70—in which the respondent 
acknowledged making a payment of $4,000 to facilitate the processing of 
items through customs—seems at odds with the FCPA’s statutory excep-
tion for facilitating payments379  That payment arguably was intended to 
“move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision” and did not 
involve “any discretionary action.”380  Indeed, the Legal Vice Presidency’s 
advisory opinion takes the position that, because bribes intended to induce 
even proper action are improper, “facilitation payments are not exempted” 
from the ambit of a Corrupt Practice.381
Also unclear is whether, or to what extent, the respondent’s mental 
state bears on the definition of “influence improperly.”  The Sanctions 
Board has made clear that the respondent must have “acted with a purpose 
to . . . influence improperly the actions of another party . . . .”382  This 
phrasing suggests that, at minimum, a respondent must act intentionally to 
influence another, and the means of influence must be improper.  Less 
clear, however, is whether the term “with a purpose” means the respondent 
must know or believe its influence is improper.  If so, does the respondent’s 
 376.  Id.
 377.  Anne-Marie Leroy, Advisory Opinion on Certain Issues Arising in Connection with 
Recent Sanctions Cases, Opinion No. 2010/1, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY UNIT OF THE WORLD
BANK, ¶ 55 (Nov. 15, 2010). 
 378.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enforcement Div. of the U.S. Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n, FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 25 
(2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.
pdf  [https://perma.cc/V2RF-X4MU]. 
 379.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 70, ¶ 20 (2014). 
 380.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). See also Michael S. Diamant & Jesenka 
Mrdjenovic, Don’t You Forget About Me: The Continuing Viability of the FCPA’s Facilitat-
ing Payments Exception, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (2012) (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 and 
the facilitating payments exception). 
 381.  Anne-Marie Leroy, supra note 377, at ¶ 55.   
 382.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, supra note 374, at ¶ 75 (emphasis added). 
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subjective belief of improper conduct suffice or must the respondent be-
lieve his or her conduct is improper as defined by the World Bank?  The 
Sanctions Board has thus far not addressed this issue in any publicly avail-
able decision. 
Comparing this standard with the FCPA’s mens rea requirement 
shows a key similarity and a key difference.  The FCPA requires corrupt 
intent.  It does not define the term, but legislative history states that “[t]he 
word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongful-
ly influence the recipient.”383 Legislative history also clarifies that the 
FCPA was intended to distinguish payments “to induce the recipient to 
misuse his official position”384 and payments “which merely move a partic-
ular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any 
discretionary action.”385  Again, the latter are facilitation payments and do 
not give rise to liability under the FCPA.386
Further, the FCPA prohibits offers or payments to a foreign official 
for the purpose of “obtaining or retaining business.”387  But the sought-after 
business need not be with the foreign government or foreign government 
instrumentality that receives the offer or payment.388  This element of the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions is slightly more specific than the Bank’s 
definition of a Corrupt Practice. The Bank’s definition encompasses pay-
ments to “improperly influence the actions of another party,” and the 
Guidelines explain that an influence is “improper” if it is intended to yield 
an “undue advantage.”389  In the context of Bank enforcement actions dis-
cussed above, however, “undue advantage” would almost always result in 
commercial and economic benefits not otherwise available, bringing the 
practical implications of this definition very much in line with the FCPA’s 
“obtaining or retaining business” requirement. 
Duress likely is an available defense to a Corrupt Practice.390  The 
World Bank Guidelines and Sanction Board decisions have not defined du-
ress, and the only relevant publicly available decision on this topic found 
that the record failed to support a finding of duress.  In Sanctions Board 
Decision No. 60, the respondents alleged “that they were subject to an ex-
tortion scheme and acted under duress, with the Consultancy Agreement 
 383.  S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
 384.  Id.
 385.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, supra note 380, at 8.
 386.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).  For a more detailed discussion of facilitation payments, see 
Warin et. al., supra note 22, at A-17. 
387. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a).
388.  See Warin et. al., supra note 22, at A-16 (interpreting the meaning of the FCPA 
prohibitions on payments to foreign officials). 
 389.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.16 n.19. 
 390.  Sanctions Board Decision No. 60, supra note 368, at ¶ 88. 
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imposed on them by the Procurement Advisor.”391  In rejecting this argu-
ment, the Sanctions Board noted that the respondents invited the Procure-
ment Advisor to travel abroad with them and actively sought his advice.392
Although the respondents claimed they felt obligated to pay the procure-
ment advisor, the Sanctions Board found “no evidence that such payments 
were due to threats, implicit or express, or that they made any attempt to 
terminate their arrangement with the Procurement Advisor.”393
In rejecting the argument from the respondents, the Sanctions Board 
implicitly acknowledged that duress could be a valid defense to a Corrupt 
Practice charge.  This is intuitive.  The intent level required for any infrac-
tion can be obviated if the actor was compelled to the action by an external 
force against his or her will.  The U.S. enforcers of the FCPA have explicit-
ly acknowledged as much in the context of that law’s enforcement.394  Here 
too, despite the differing texts, there appears to be some convergence in the 
practical operation of these two anti-bribery regimes.  This concurrence 
could allow the FCPA’s more-developed jurisprudence, forged through 
nearly 40 years of enforcement, to inform aspects of Sanctions Board’s un-
derstanding of a Corrupt Practice. 
D. Collusive Practice 
Collusive conduct is a common form of wrongdoing leading to sanc-
tions.395  The definition of a Collusive Practice has gradually shifted from 
narrow, specifically-defined conduct involving artificial price fixing be-
tween bidders or consultants to any form of simulated competition includ-
ing any participants in the procurement process.  In its earliest form, collu-
sion was subsumed by the definition of a Fraudulent Practice, with the 
latter defined to “include[] collusive practices among [bidders/consultants] 
(prior to or after [bid submission/submission of proposals]) designed to es-
tablish [bid] prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the 
Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition.”396  Starting in 
2004, collusion became a standalone Sanctionable Practice defined as “a 
scheme or arrangement between two or more [bidders/consultants], with or 
without the knowledge of the Borrower, designed to establish [bid] prices 
 391.  Id. at ¶ 86. 
 392.  Id. at ¶ 87. 
 393.  Id. at ¶ 87. 
 394.  Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 372, at 27. 
 395.  World Bank Group, supra note 367, at 22. 
 396.  Id. at 48 (Dec. 2011).  This definition applies to cases brought under the January 
1995 version of the Procurement Guidelines, which were revised in January and August 
1996, September 1997, and January 1999, or the January 1997 version of the Consultant 
Guidelines, which were revised in September 1997, January 1999, and May 2002. Id. at 47.
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at artificial, non-competitive levels.”397
The Guidelines currently define a Collusive Practice expansively as 
(1) “an arrangement between two or more parties” (2) “designed to achieve 
an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of an-
other party . . . .”398  Although the terms “influence improperly” and “im-
proper purpose” appear to contemplate a wide array of misconduct, an ex-
planatory footnote narrows their application by defining the term “parties” 
as “participants in the procurement process (including public officials) at-
tempting either themselves, or through another person or entity not partici-
pating in the procurement or selection process, to simulate competition or 
to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels, or are privy to 
each other’s bid prices or other conditions.”399  This footnote alters the 
standard of finding a Collusive Practice from prior definitions in two sig-
nificant ways:  first, collusion can involve both participants and non-
participants in the procurement process.  Second, a Collusive Practice now 
includes conduct attempting to “simulate competition” in addition to, as 
provided in prior versions, conduct intended to create artificial, non-
competitive bid prices.  World Bank Guidelines and Sanctions Board deci-
sions do not differentiate “simulate[d] competition” from other forms of 
collusion.
Typical collusion cases involve allegations of coordinated bid pricing 
to ensure that one individual or entity wins the contract.400  Although many 
Sanctions Board decisions involve collusion, the available case law is 
sparse:  no publicly available full-text decision and only five summarized 
decisions in the Law Digest discuss collusion.401  Two of the five cases dis-
cussed in the Law Digest found insufficient evidence of a Collusive Prac-
tice.402  In the Law Digest cases, INT alleged that respondents engaged in 
collusive behavior to obtain a disproportionately large number of con-
tracts,403 participated in a collusive scheme involving government officials 
to direct awards to certain contractors in exchange for bribes,404 and coor-
 397.  Id. at 48 (Dec. 2011).  This definition applies to cases brought under the May 2004 
versions of the Procurement or Consultant Guidelines. Id.
 398.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 39, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iii).
 399.  Id. at ¶ 1.16(a)(iii) n.22.
 400.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011, at 30 (Dec. 2011) (cit-
ing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)); id. at 32 (citing Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 45 (2011)).
 401.  Id. at 25-32.
 402.  Id. at 26 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4 (2009) and Sanctions Board Deci-
sion No. 5 (2009)).
 403.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4 (2009)).
404.  Id. at 30 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)).  
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dinated bid prices with other firms to ensure that the respondent would win 
the contract.405
1. Elements of a Collusive Practice 
The available guidance from the Sanctions Board concerns only the 
elements of a Collusive Practice as defined in the May 2004 Procurement 
Guidelines.406 The Sanctions Board has held that proving the first element 
of a Collusive Practice—i.e., whether a scheme or arrangement between 
bidders exists—does not automatically satisfy the second element of a Col-
lusive Practice—i.e., that the scheme or arrangement was designed to set 
prices at artificial, non-competitive levels.407  The Law Digest further ex-
plains that the term “artificial, non-competitive levels” involves “the nature 
of the pricing, not the simple quantitative level of the prices.”408  Because 
“[c]olluding bidders might well agree to submit relatively low prices” or, 
conversely, “submit higher prices for any number of reasons,” a showing of 
specific price points “is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient to estab-
lish collusion.”409
The mens rea necessary to commit a Collusive Practice is unclear.  It 
appears, however, that some amount of intent is required, as the arrange-
ment must be “designed to achieve an improper purpose” under the latest 
definition,410 or “designed to establish [bid] prices at artificial, non-
competitive levels” under prior definitions.411
2. Evidence of Collusion 
It is difficult to completely understand the Sanctions Board’s assess-
ment of collusive evidence without the benefit of fully published decisions.  
The available summaries in the Law Digest, however, suggest that the 
Sanctions Board relies heavily on circumstantial indicia of collusion.412  In 
Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, the Sanctions Board gave “primary 
weight” to and found “particularly compelling” evidence that two of the re-
spondents had identical pricing in the same bid tender and concluded that it 
 405.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40 (2010)); id. at 32 (citing Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 45 (2011)).
 406.  Id. at 48-49.
 407.  Id. at 48 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).
 408.  Id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).   
 409.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶ 51 (2011)).   
 410.  Id. at 48. 
 411.  Id.
 412.  See id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009), which states 
that the Sanctions Board used different factors as evidence of indicia of collusion).
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was more likely than not that the parties had engaged in Collusive Practic-
es, especially in light of their failure to adequately explain the similari-
ties.413  But, as discussed above, INT need not show specific pricing across 
bids to prove collusion.  Likewise, in Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, the 
Sanctions Board found collusion by relying on high bid prices, bids con-
taining “significant errors,” “strange and unnatural” bid prices, symmetrical 
relationships among bids, the submission of fraudulent bid securities, and 
“clusters” of bids.414
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanctions Board similarly 
found the respondents liable in light of an “inexplicable degree of congrui-
ty” across bid prices, identical total bid prices in certain sections of two of 
the bids at issue, and “insignificant variance” between the total prices of all 
bids.  The Sanctions Board also rejected the respondent’s contention that 
the similar bid prices were caused by shared suppliers in a small market, 
finding that a “simple commonality of suppliers . . . would not explain the 
high degree of congruity . . . nor the systematic small variations between 
prices.”415  Moreover, it pointed to physical similarities across bids that in-
dicated their shared preparation, including similar handwriting, identical 
substantive and spelling errors, common contact information, identical en-
velopes, cover sheets with the same font, the same computer file path num-
ber at the bottom of the bid documents, and “the apparent re-use of bidding 
documents from one firm, whose name had been partially concealed with 
correction fluid, by another firm.”416
The Sanctions Board has taken this approach on other occasions.  In 
Sanctions Board No. 45, the Sanctions Board relied on documentary evi-
dence showing several identical errors and other physical similarities across 
bids in concluding that there was “ample support for [INT’s] allegation that 
the bids submitted by the respondent and another firm had been jointly pre-
pared with coordinated bid prices.”417  In addition, while the “use of shared 
administrative support by different bidders” is not necessarily proof of col-
lusion, it suggests the existence of collusion “when viewed in conjunction 
with other evidence of extensive and substantive similarities across the bids 
in question.”418  Circumstantial evidence of collusion is not boundless.  The 
Sanctions Board has found that general business cooperation among bid-
ders—i.e., referring to other bidders as “business colleagues,” “common 
business interests,” or prior work on the same project—is “neither a viable 
 413.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, ¶ 6 (2007)).
 414.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009)).
 415.  Id. at 50 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 21 (2010)).   
 416.  Id. (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 22 (2010)).   
 417.  Id. at 52 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶¶ 30-33 (2011)).  
 418.  Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 23 (2010)).
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explanation for the proximity of bids in an allegedly collusive scheme, nor 
presumptive proof of collusion between the bidders.”419
Of course, in addition to circumstantial evidence in the bids them-
selves, the Sanctions Board reviews the “totality of the evidence [available 
to it], including all statements made in the interviews, read in context and 
weighted for relative credibility.”420  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, 
the Sanctions Board found compelling testimonial evidence of “confiden-
tial and non-confidential witnesses” coupled with other “indicia of collu-
sion, including high bid prices, symmetrical relationships among bids, bids 
containing significant errors, ‘clusters’ of bids, ‘strange and unnatural’ bid 
prices, submission of fraudulent bid securities, and the inconsistent applica-
tion of criteria within the prequalification process.”421
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanctions Board found that 
one respondent’s statement regarding a “verbal or gentleman’s agreement” 
coupled with another bidder’s admission “to having known about the prox-
imity in bid prices” and making a mistake by not carefully reviewing the 
bids “could be construed to some degree as admissions of collusive ar-
rangements.”422  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, collusion was sub-
stantiated through corroborating statements from key witnesses indicating 
that the bids submitted by the respondent and another firm had been jointly 
prepared with coordinated bid prices.423  Moreover, the Sanctions Board 
has considered testimonial evidence of witnesses who initially denied but 
later admitted to collusive conduct because not “all participants in an al-
leged collusive arrangement will spontaneously and consistently admit the 
charges.”424
3. U.S. Antitrust Law 
Clear parallels between the Bank’s anti-collusion regime and U.S. an-
titrust law exist.  Just as the Bank’s Guidelines prohibit arrangements de-
signed to set bid prices at artificial levels, U.S. antitrust laws proscribe a 
wide variety of anti-competitive behavior.  In the United States, antitrust 
violations are subject to criminal and civil enforcement under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, among other statutes.  Antitrust liability under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act arises where (1) the defendant was “a party to a contract, 
 419.  Id. at 47 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 27 (2010)).   
 420.  Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 25 (2010)).   
 421.  Id. at 49 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009)).  
 422.  Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 24 (2010)).  
 423.  Id. at 52 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 45, ¶¶ 30-33 (2011), which notes 
key witnesses’ corroborating statements in finding collusion).  
 424.  Id. at 51 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 25 (2010)).
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combination . . . or conspiracy” and (2) “the conspiracy to which the de-
fendant was a party imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade.”425  U.S. 
courts analyze the latter element according to the “rule of reason,” which, 
under a “totality of the circumstances” test, considers whether the conduct 
in question promotes or suppresses market competition.426  Certain practic-
es, such as bid rigging and price fixing, are presumptively an unreasonable 
restraint on competition and are thus considered a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act.427  As such, per se violations require no further inquiry into 
the unlawful practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those 
who engaged in the practice.428
Though never addressed explicitly by the Sanctions Board or the 
Guidelines, there appears to be little room in Bank jurisprudence for the 
kind of “rule of reason” approach contemplated by U.S. courts.  Unlike the 
Sherman Act, the definition of a Collusive Practice does not consider 
whether the conduct at issue impacted the market.  But all relevant publicly 
available Sanctions Board decisions involve some variation of price fixing 
and bid rigging, both of which are presumed under U.S. law to negatively 
impact competition.  In theory, however, a defense should be available for 
respondents who enter into arrangements for a purpose that is not “improp-
er.”
Both the Sherman Act and World Bank require evidence of conspiracy 
between parties; however, the standard of proof under each regime diverges 
significantly.  As discussed above, the Sanctions Board has found sufficient 
evidence of an agreement through, for example, high prices across bids, 
significant errors across bids, “strange and unnatural” prices across bids, 
symmetrical relationships among bids, identical pricing between respond-
ents in the same bid tender, and an “otherwise inexplicable degree of con-
gruity” across bid prices.429  Such evidence, labeled “conscious parallelism” 
 425.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 426.  Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (requiring that 
the fact finder weigh “all of the circumstances” to determine whether a restrictive practice 
imposes “an unreasonable restraint on competition”). 
 427.  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 428.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Antitrust Laws, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/WH8M-
DY6S] (last visited Apr. 3 2016) (explaining that the Sherman Act provides no defense or 
justification to per se violators whose acts so harmful to competition that they are almost 
always illegal.) 
 429.  See Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 at 49-50 (citing Sanc-
tions Board Decision No. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6 (2009); Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶¶ 20-24 
(2010)) (listing numerous circumstances under which the Sanction Board has found suffi-
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by U.S. courts, is insufficient under the Sherman Act because it “does not 
establish . . . contract, combination, or conspiracy.”430  Where the claim re-
lies on parallel conduct, U.S. courts have commonly required plaintiffs to 
proffer evidence of “plus factors” to meet the conspiracy element, such as 
“motive to conspire,” “parallel acts [that] were against the apparent eco-
nomic self-interest” of those involved, and “a high level of interfirm com-
munications.”431  These factors, according to U.S. courts, “tend to ensure 
that courts punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the 
unilateral, independent conduct of competitors.”432
The Sanctions Board, by contrast, has found collusion solely through 
parallel behavior, without the “plus factors” U.S. courts typically require.  
In Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, for example, the Sanctions Board 
found “particularly compelling the circumstantial evidence of identical 
pricing between the respondents in the same bid tender” to the point of 
shifting the burden of proof on the respondents to explain how their con-
duct was not collusive.433  In Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, the Sanc-
tions Board found collusion where there was an 
inexplicable degree of congruity across the bid prices contained 
in the three bids at issue, including a significant number of unit 
prices that were either identical or differed consistently by small, 
standardized amounts across the three bids; identical total bid 
prices in several sections of two bids . . . and insignificant vari-
ance between the total prices of all bids.434
This lower evidentiary standard likely stems from the administrative 
nature of Sanctions Board proceedings, but it also risks conflating inde-
pendent actions between competitors with truly collusive conduct.435
cient evidence of collusion).
 430.  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007) (internal cita-
tion and quotation marks omitted) (establishing a “plausibility” standard for pleading).  
 431.  In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 
398 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable 
inference of a conspiracy.  To move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show 
that certain plus factors are present . . . [which] may include (1) evidence that the defendant 
had a motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2) evidence that the defendant acted 
contrary to its interests; and (3) evidence implying a traditional conspiracy.” (internal cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted)).  
 432.  Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 433.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011 supra 225 note, at 49 
(citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 1, ¶ 6 (2007)). 
 434.  Id. at 50 (citing Sanctions Board Decision No. 40, ¶ 21 (2010)).  
 435.  To be fair, the burden of proof for civil antitrust enforcement actions also is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 
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E. Coercive Practice 
The January 2011 Procurement Guidelines define a “Coercive Prac-
tice” as “impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or 
indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the 
actions of a party.”436  The term “party” is defined as “a participant in the 
procurement process or contract execution.”437
The Sanctions Board had not reviewed an appeal involving allegations 
of a Coercive Practice as of publication of the Law Digest.438  Moreover, 
none of the published decisions available as of December 2015 on the 
Bank’s website involves allegations of a Coercive Practice.  One World 
Bank publication, however, has provided that coercion includes threats to 
harm the future business interests of a competitor or the physical well-
being of competitors’ staff to ensure that they submit inflated bids.439  Co-
ercion could also involve the payment of money to “losing” bidders to ob-
tain the winning bid.440
There is at least one instance in which the SDO sanctioned a person 
for engaging in a Coercive Practice.  In 2014, the Bank debarred an indi-
vidual for a minimum period of five years for engaging in Fraudulent and 
Coercive Practices.441  INT alleged that the respondent “engaged in a coer-
cive practice by threatening an individual.”442  Because he failed to submit 
a response, the accusations and recommended sanction were uncontested.443
526, 535 (D.D.C. 1994) (refusing to find collusion because a preponderance of the evidence 
did not establish that the defendant’s bids in question had resulted from collusion with its 
competitors).   
 436.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 142, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iv).  Before the 
World Bank’s 2006 reforms, Coercive Practice was defined as “harming or threatening to 
harm, directly or indirectly, persons, or their property to influence their participation in a 
procurement process, or affect the execution of a contract.”  Guidelines: Procurement Under 
IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, supra note 218, at ¶ 1.14(a)(iv). 
 437.  World Bank Procurement Guidelines, supra note 142, at ¶ 1.16(a)(iv) n.23.   
 438.  Upholding the Rule of Law in the Fights Against Corruption and Poverty,
SANCTIONS BOARD LAW DIGEST, (The World Bank, D.C.) Dec. 2011, supra note 225, at 22 
(reporting that the Sanctions Board had not received any appeals involving allegations of 
coercion as of October 31, 2011).
 439.  The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Guidelines and Sanctions Reform: A User’s 
Guide, supra note 11, at 7 (defining and providing examples of coercive practice).   
 440.  Id. (describing an instance of coercion).  
 441.  Board Sanctions Case No. 264 (Yusri Yusuf), Notice of Uncontested Sanctions 
Proceedings (2014) (notifying of the sanctions proceedings against Yusri Yusuf based on his 
fraudulent practice of submitting misleading vehicle registration documents and related ma-
terials).
 442.  Id. at ¶ 3.
443.  Id. at ¶ 7 (deeming the sanction against Yusuf uncontested because no response had 
been submitted within the specific period). 
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The Sanctions Board therefore did not review the case and did not issue an 
opinion delineating the factual background, evidence, or analysis. 
Beyond these brief examples, little else is known concerning the legal 
elements and evidentiary requirements for finding a Coercive Practice. 
The concept of coercion is found throughout U.S. law, including as a 
prohibited criminal offense and an affirmative defense to criminal charges.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines coercion as “[c]ompulsion of a free agent 
by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force.”444  In the 
criminal context, coercion is defined as follows: 
Coercion intended to restrict another’s freedom of action by 
(1) threatening to commit a criminal act against that person; 
(2) threatening to accuse that person of having committed a crim-
inal act; (3) threatening to expose a secret that either would sub-
ject the victim to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or would impair 
the victim’s credit or goodwill, or (4) taking or withholding offi-
cial action or causing an official to take or withhold action.445
In addition to its criminal application, coercion can include “[c]onduct 
that constitutes the improper use of economic power to compel another to 
submit to the wishes of one who wields it.”446
Due to the broad language used by the Bank to define Coercive Prac-
tices and the lack of precedent, it is difficult to pinpoint which U.S. laws 
are most comparable and could serve as a vehicle to analyze the possible 
contours of this Sanctionable Practice as it develops in Sanctions Board; 
however, a few states have adopted criminal coercion statutes based on 
Model Penal Code § 212.5 that appear to be analogous.447  For example, 
New York criminalizes coercion under its penal law.448  The statute pro-
vides, in part, as follows: 
A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he or 
she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the 
latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain 
from engaging in conduct in which he or she has a legal right to 
engage . . . by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the 
demand is not complied with, the actor or another will [engage in 
nine threatened consequences].449
The nine listed consequences include causing “physical injury to a 
 444. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (10th ed. 2014). 
445.  Id.
 446.  Id.
 447.  See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2906 (West 2016) (defining criminal coercion 
and noting that the section was derived from Model Penal Code § 212.5). 
448. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (McKinney 2008). 
 449.  Id.
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person; or . . . damage to property,” both of which are explicitly included 
within the Bank’s Coercive Practice definition.450  The New York statute 
also outlines six other specific events that may form the basis of coer-
cion,451 and it concludes with a catch-all provision that encompasses “any 
other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is 
calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his or her 
health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or 
personal relationships.”452  The New York statute is clearly more specific 
than the Bank’s provision defining Coercive Practice.  Due to the Sanctions 
Board’s lack of guidance, however, it is unclear whether statutory coercion 
is more or less narrowly tailored than Coercive Practice regarding the req-
uisite underlying conduct, and if the evidence weighed by U.S. courts to 
assess such conduct would be comparable to that considered by the World 
Bank.
CONCLUSION
As the reach of the World Bank’s lending system continues to expand, 
so too will its enforcement net.  Therefore, the development of the five 
Sanctionable Practices merits significant attention and care.  The foregoing 
is presented in the hope that it contributes to such a process, as well as 
serving as a helpful primer for corporations and practitioners alike in navi-
gating the Bank enforcement process.  The robust analogues under U.S. 
law are merely one place where the Sanctions Board could (and should) 
look as it develops the jurisprudence of the Bank’s Sanctionable Practices.  
But given the convergence of many of these legal concepts, the roots of 
some of the Sanctionable Practices from U.S. law, and the long history of 
these enforcement regimes in the United States, U.S. law can offer a rich 
and textured reference point for the Sanctions Board.  In particular, the ex-
perience of white collar enforcement and its evolution in the United States 
can help to identify pitfalls and clarify thorny legal issues of, for example, 
mens rea.  Thorough consideration of the practical implications and study 
of analogous legal concepts will lend further credibility to the Bank’s integ-
 450.  Id.
 451.  These events include engaging “in other conduct constituting a crime”; accusing a 
person “of a crime or caus[ing] criminal charges to be instituted against him”; exposing “a 
secret . . . tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule”; causing a “boy-
cott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person’s business [except] when 
the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group”; testifying or providing infor-
mation, or refusing to do so, “with respect to another’s legal claim or defense”; and using a 
“position as a public servant” to perform an act related to official duties, or refusing to do 
so, “in such manner as to affect some person adversely.” Id.
 452.  Id.
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rity enforcement, aiding further its global fight against corruption. 
